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FROZEN IN TIME: THE STATE ACTION 
DOCTRINE'S APPLICATION TO 
AMATEUR SPORTS 
DIONNE L. KOLLERt 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has made clear that "[t]he Constitution 
constrains governmental action 'by whatever instruments or in 
whatever modes that action may be taken.' "1 This sweeping 
promise, however, rings hollow in the area of amateur athletics, 
where amateur athletes and others are, in a very real sense, 
caught in what the Supreme Court calls the "essential 
dichotomy"2 between entities that are public, and therefore 
subject to the limitations of the Constitution, and those that are 
private, and consequently are not so limited. For nearly two 
decades, since the Supreme Court's decisions in San Francisco 
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee3 and 
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian,4 both the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") and the 
United States Olympic Committee ("USOC") have been 
considered by courts and commentators to be "private" entities, 
and not state actors, meaning that constitutional protections do 
not apply to their actions. These decisions illustrate not only the 
troubled nature of the so-called "state action doctrine," but also 
the extraordinary consequence of the doctrine's application in the 
amateur sports context. In short, a static conception of the 
t Assistant Professor of Law, the University of Baltimore School of Law. I would 
like to thank Michele Gilman, Leigh Goodmark, Michael Meyerson, Ryan 
Rodenberg, Steven Shapiro, and Maureen Weston for their insightful comments on 
earlier drafts of this article, and Seth Yaffo for assistance with research. 
1 Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995) (quoting Ex 
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1880». 
2 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972). 
3 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
4 488 U.S. 179 (1988). 
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USOC and the NCAA has developed, so that they are considered 
private as a matter of law. 
This static notion of the relationship between these entities 
and the government has created what is essentially a legal 
twilight zone where the Constitution is not applied to exercises of 
state power5 in amateur sports. This Article explores that 
twilight zone and argues that it has created significant, 
unintended consequences. Part II of this Article explains the 
state action doctrine and its application to amateur sports, 
detailing the state action requirement generally and explaining 
the major cases applying the state action doctrine to the NCAA, 
the USOC, and state high school athletic associations. Part III 
explains the consequences of these cases. Specifically, this part 
argues that the Supreme Court's holdings in San Francisco Arts 
& Athletics and Tarkanian have had the effect of holding the 
USOC and NCAA to be private actors as a matter of law. 
Moreover, this static conception of the USOC and NCAA as 
private actors has provided a powerful incentive for the 
government to pursue policy objectives, such as combating 
performance-enhancing drug use through amateur sports 
regulation, without its methods being subject to constitutional 
constraint. Finally, this Article asserts that the application of 
the state action doctrine to amateur sports organizations in a 
way that denies amateur athletes constitutional protections does 
not serve the goals of the state action doctrine, but actually 
undermines the legitimacy of the entities whose "autonomy" the 
doctrine purportedly aims to protect. 
I. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE AND AMATEUR SPORTS 
To properly examine the consequences of the state action 
doctrine's application to amateur sports organizations, the state 
action requirement itself and the prominent state action-amateur 
sport cases must be reviewed. 
A. The State Action Requirement 
The Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution prohibit government action that deprives 
"any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
5 This Article uses the terms "state" and "state power" to mean exercises of 
authority by both the federal and state governments. 
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law."6 The Supreme Court has held that this prohibition applies 
only to actions taken by the state-so called "state action."7 This 
requirement dates back to shortly after the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In 1883, in The Civil Rights Cases, the 
Supreme Court invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875, a 
Reconstruction Era statute that sought to prohibit racial 
discrimination in restaurants and other privately-owned 
ventures.8 Interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court held that "[i]t is state action of a particular 
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual 
rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment."9 The 
Supreme Court has subsequently explained that with respect to 
constitutional due process protections, "this Court in the Civil 
Rights Cases ... affirmed the essential dichotomy set forth in 
that Amendment between deprivation by the State, subject to 
scrutiny under its provisions, and private conduct, 'however 
discriminatory or wrongful,' against which the Fourteenth 
Amendment offers no shield."l0 
The Supreme Court's primary justification for the state 
action doctrine is that it "preserves an area of individual 
freedom" and limits the reach of government power, specifically 
the power of the judiciary.!l Thus, the doctrine preserves 
individual autonomy by ensuring that private individuals can act 
without being subject to the limits of the Constitution. l2 In 
addition, the doctrine serves the interests of federalism, by 
allowing the states to determine to what extent private conduct 
should be regulated. l3 Indeed, promoting liberty and limiting 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; accord U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
7 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10-11 (1883); see Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503, 507-08 (1985). 
8 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 4, 18-19; Francisco M. Ugarte, 
Reconstruction Redux: Rehnquist, Morrison, and the Civil Rights Cases, 41 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 481, 496-97 (2006). 
9 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (1883); see DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (stating that the purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment "was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that 
the State protected them from each other."). 
10 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (quoting Shelley v. 
Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948». 
11 See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982). 
12 See id. at 936; DeShaney, 489 U.S at 196 (explaining that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects "'against unwarranted government interference'" (quoting 
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982»). 
13 See G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: 
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government power are bedrock principles of constitutional law, 
and the notion that it is important to make a distinction between 
areas of life that are public and those that are private intuitively 
makes sense. It is believed that there are certain spheres of life, 
such as amateur athletics, which are private, so that the state is 
not, and should not, be involved.l4 Effectuating this distinction, 
there are two ways in which an entity can be held to be a state 
actor subject to constitutional standards. Most obviously is the 
case where the challenged action was taken by the state itself, 
through a state agency or state official.15 The second instance 
involves the more complicated scenario where the challenged 
action was taken by a private actor, but the state is so closely 
involved in the conduct of the private actor that it can be said 
that the challenged action was, in effect, the work of the state. 16 
The state action inquiry is also used to determine whether a 
party acted "under color of state law" for purposes of claims 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.17 
The Supreme Court's willingness to find that a private actor 
is engaged in state action has changed over time. Starting in the 
1950s, the Court took a fairly liberal view of the state action 
requirement, such that ''by 1970 the Court was able and 
apparently willing to find state action in almost any situation."18 
However, in the 1970s and 1980s the Court significantly shifted 
its approach and strengthened the requirement so that it was far 
more difficult to show state action.l9 Specifically, in 1982, the 
Court decided three cases that narrowed the scope of the state 
The Search for Government Responsibility, 34 Hous. L. REV. 333, 339 (1997); 
Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 542-43. 
14 See Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory; A Casenote on Flagg 
Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1323 (1982) (discussing "our 
psychological and ideological need to believe that there are essentially private 
realms, albeit circumscribed by state and society, in which actions are autonomous"). 
15 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. 
16 Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378-79 (1995); Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 848 (1982). 
17 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936, 942. 
18 Recent Development, Constitutional Law-State Action Doctrine Invoked as a 
Limitation upon the Reach of the Fourteenth Amendment, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1237, 
1237 (1972). 
19 See id.; Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1367, 1413 (2003) (noting that the Court is "significantly more unwilling to find 
state action and hold private individuals to constitutional requirements"); Hayward 
D. Reynolds, Deconstructing State Action; The Politics of State Action, 20 OHIO N.U. 
L. REV. 847,890 (1994). 
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action doctrine. In Blum v. Yaretsky,20 the Court held that the 
decision to transfer Medicaid patients residing in private nursing 
homes was not state action, noting that it was the private 
nursing home and its private physicians who ultimately made 
the decision to transfer.21 Moreover, the Court held that the 
mere regulation of the treatment the patients received and the 
subsidy through the Medicaid program was not enough for state 
action.22 Similarly, in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,23 the Court held 
that a private high school for troubled students was not engaged 
in state action when it terminated one of its teachers, despite the 
fact that the school was regulated by the state and the school 
received nearly all of its funding from the state.24 Finally, in 
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil CO.,25 the Court held that there was state 
action where a private creditor obtained a pre-judgment writ of 
attachment of the debtor's property.26 The Court found that the 
attachment of property was joint action between the private 
creditor and the state, which issued the writ. In Lugar, the 
Court announced a two-part analysis for determining whether 
seemingly private conduct could be attributed to the state. First, 
the challenged action 
must be caused by the exercise of [a] right or privilege created 
by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the or by a 
person for whom the State is responsible ... [and], second, the 
party charged with the deprivation of rights must be a person 
who may fairly be said to be a state actor ... [either] because he 
is a state official, because he has acted together with or has 
obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his 
conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.27 
As will be discussed below, these three cases set the stage for the 
state action decisions involving the USOC and the NCAA. 
There are now several theories that the Supreme Court has 
used to determine when the actions of a private actor will be 
subject to constitutional scrutiny. The Court has looked at 
whether "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State 
20 457 U.S. 991 (1982). 
21 Id. at 1006-07. 
22 Id. at 1004-{)5. 
23 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 
24 Id. at 840. 
25 457 U.S. 922 (1982). 
26 Id. at 922, 942. 
27 Id. at 937. 
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and the challenged action."28 The Court has also explained that 
private action can become the action of the state where the state 
"has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant 
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in 
law be deemed to be that of the State,"29 or where the private 
entity acts as a "willful participant in joint activity with the State 
or its agents."30 The Court also has found state action where a 
private actor is "controlled by an 'agency of the state' " or when 
the private actor has been delegated a function that has been 
"'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.' "31 More 
recently, the Court stated that the "pervasive entwinement" of 
state officials in the structure of an ostensibly private entity 
would be enough to support a finding of state action. 32 
In short, the Court has made clear that constitutional 
standards apply only when the alleged infringement of "federal 
right[s] be fairly attributable to the State"33 or "when it can be 
said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct" at 
issue.34 However, as the Court explained in Brentwood Academy 
v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n ("Brentwood f'), the 
analysis of what conduct the state is "responsible for" is not one 
that is undertaken with reference to bright-line rules or specific 
criteria. 35 Instead, the Court stated that "no one fact can 
function as a necessary condition across the board for finding 
state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient, 
for there may be some countervailing reason against attributing 
activity to the government."36 Thus, the Court stated that 
"examples may be the best teachers."37 
28 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974); see also Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722, 725 (1961). 
29 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). 
30 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941; see also Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). 
31 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n (Brentwood 1), 531 
U.S. 288, 296 (2001) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dir. of City Trusts of Phila., 353 
U.S. 230, 231 (1957»; Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (quoting 
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353); see also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966); 
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946). See generally Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 
461 (1953) (discussing that prevention of discrimination against voters because of 
their race is a national policy and therefore the concern of the government). 
32 Brentwood I, 531 U.S. at 29l. 
33 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. 
34 Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004. 
35 Brentwood I, 531 U.S. at 295. 
36 Id. at 295-96. 
37 Id. at 296. 
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Because of the varying formulations of the state action 
doctrine, it has been a target of scholarly criticism for decades. 38 
Some commentators have suggested that the Court's state 
action jurisprudence lacks coherence.39 Others have advocated 
eliminating the requirement altogether.40 Still others have 
stated that the state action doctrine is ''both grounded in racism 
and an obstacle to the full effectuation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment."41 Some have even argued that the doctrine was so 
flawed that it would cease to exist.42 A central feature of the 
commentary over the state action doctrine is the desirability and 
feasibility of distinguishing public from private acts.43 Scholars 
have argued that it is impossible to distinguish the two, because 
of legal positivist notions that all conduct can be traced to some 
decision of the state to either affirmatively permit the conduct, or 
a decision not to prohibit it.44 Regardless of whether such lines 
between public and private conduct can be drawn, the Supreme 
Court continues to draw it by relying on the state action doctrine. 
Yet wherever and however that "state action" line is drawn, 
one thing is constant. The doctrine captures the particular 
circumstances of a relationship between a private entity and the 
government, and, based on those circumstances, categorizes the 
private entity as either "private" or "public." Recognizing that 
relationships are dynamic in nature and change over time and 
38 E.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and 
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REV. 69,91 (1967) ("On the cases and on the 
opinions, 'state action' is a doctrine in trouble."); Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 503; 
Barbara Rook Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action and the Allocation of 
Responsibility for Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1053, 
1053-54 (1990); Jerre S. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEX. L. REV. 347 
(1963). 
39 Alan R. Madry, Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment; State 
Action, Federalism and Congress, 59 Mo. L. REV. 499, 509-11 (1994); Snyder, supra 
note 38, at 1054-55. 
40 Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 506-07,550. 
41 Ugarte, supra note 8, at 482. 
42 John Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on 
the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855, 872 (1966); Williams, supra 
note 38, at 382, 389. 
43 See Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, 
and the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT 329, 334 (1993) 
("The overwhelming weight of published academic opinion has rejected the premise 
that legal doctrine can rest on a supposed distinction between public and private 
actions."). 
44 Id.; Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1351 (1982). 
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through circumstance, the state action doctrine does not have one 
formulation-and as the Court indicates-is found through a 
case-by-case inquiry. As explained below, it is in this way that 
the state action doctrine as applied to amateur sports is 
problematic. By adopting a static notion of how amateur 
sports organizations relate to the government, and how the 
government relates to them, courts and commentators have 
invited the government to exercise far greater power through and 
over amateur athletics. 
B. The State Action-Amateur Sport Cases 
Several notable state action cases involve amateur sports. 
This likely reflects sports programs' integration with public 
educational institutions and the federal government's growing 
interest in amateur sports as part of larger policy agendas, such 
as fighting drug use. To be sure, there is state action to support 
a constitutional challenge against an entity such as a public high 
school or university that takes action against a student-athlete, 
or another individua1.45 However, the area that has produced 
noteworthy state action litigation, and on which this article is 
focused, concerns organizations such as the NCAA and the USOC 
that are without a doubt shaped and influenced by state power, 
but structurally maintain a "private," non-governmental status. 
The result is that these entities operate in a legal twilight zone, 
caught between the state's undeniable interest in and temptation 
to regulate amateur sports, and the common wisdom that sport is 
"private." 
1. The National Collegiate Athletic Association-National 
Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian 
The NCAA is a tax-exempt, non-profit, voluntary46 member-
45 See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988). 
46 Critics have noted that the NCAA is not a voluntary organization from the 
perspective of the student· athletes who are regulated by its actions: 
I have heard the Chairman and others talk about a voluntary organization. 
I think that anybody that has studied the NCAA readily realizes that the 
athletes are not members nor are they invited to be members ... and they 
have no input, but they are controlled ... And who has been victimized by 
this? It is the student-athlete. 
Due Process and the NCAA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the 
H. Comm. on the Judicary, 108th Congo 3-4 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement 
of Rep. Spencer Bachus, Member, House Subcomm. on the Constitution). 
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ship association dedicated to the promotion of inter-collegiate 
athletics.47 Confirming that athletics are a "vital part" of 
education, the basic purpose of the NCAA, as stated in its 
constitution, is "to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an 
integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an 
integral part of the student body."48 The NCAA's rules apply to 
issues including recruitment of student-athletes, academic 
eligibility, and financial aid. 49 The NCAA also has a program for 
drug testing athletes. Despite its regulation of virtually every 
aspect of a student's athletic experience, critics have stated that 
student-athlete welfare is not one of the NCAA's central 
concerns. 50 Instead, the NCAA's focus is on its member 
institutions, as the NCAA has been characterized as the 
"organization through which many of the nation's colleges and 
universities act and speak on national athletic matters."51 
The NCAA consists of over 1,200 public and private 
institutions and athletic conferences. 52 Nearly all public and 
private colleges and universities with major athletic programs 
are members of the NCAA and therefore have agreed to conduct 
their programs in accordance with the NCAA's rules and 
regulations. 53 It is public universities, however, that make up 
the majority of the NCAA's membership. Currently, there are 
over 300,000 student-athletes competing for NCAA-member 
schools. 54 The student-athletes who compete for NCAA-member 
schools are not NCAA members themselves, but they are 
47 See NCAA Website: The Online Resource for the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, http://www.ncaa.org (follow "About the NCAA" hyperlink) (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2007). 
48 John Kitchin, The NCAA and Due Process, 5 RAN J.L. & PUB. POL'y 71, 72 
(1996). 
49 James Arslanian, The NCAA and State Action: Does the Creature Control Its 
Master?, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 333, 333 (1990). 
50 See W. Burlette Carter, Student-Athlete Welfare in a Restructured NCAA, 2 
VA. J. SPORTS & L. 1, 4-5 (2000). 
51 Kitchin, supra note 48, at 71. 
52 Matthew M. Keegan, Comment, Due Process and the NCAA: Are Innocent 
Student-Athletes Afforded Adequate Protection from Improper Sanctions? A Call for 
Change in the NCAA Enforcement Procedures, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 297, 299 (2005); 
see also NCAA Website: The Online Resource for the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, http://www.ncaa.org (follow "Composition & Sport Sponsorship of the 
Membership" hyperlink under the "Our Members" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 15, 
2007). 
53 Carter, supra note 50, at 6. 
54 Keegan, supra note 52, at 299. 
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required to follow NCAA rules. Because member schools obligate 
themselves to enforce the NCAA's rules, the NCAA does not take 
any direct action against student-athletes, coaches, or others who 
run afoul of its regulations. If the school does not take action in 
accordance with NCAA policy, the NCAA will sanction the 
member school. 55 
The NCAA's member-institutions are assigned to particular 
divisions-I, II, or III-depending upon the institution's athletic 
program's size and success. Schools that are considered to have 
the largest and most successful athletic programs, usually from 
their football and men's basketball teams, are in Division 1.56 
The NCAA currently functions through divisional management 
structures with each division promulgating its own rules for 
governance. 57 For instance, since 1997, Division I has been 
governed by a Board of Directors and Management Council, 
which adopts rules that apply to all Division I institutions. This 
structure differs markedly from the "one institution, one vote" 
system that had been in place, and that was important to the 
analysis of the state action issue in Tarkanian. 58 The national 
body of the NCAA no longer has broad rule-making authority. 
Instead, NCAA "action" now results from the divisional level, 
with much narrower participation from member schools. 59 
Until 1982, the overwhelming majority of federal courts held 
that the NCAA was a state actor.60 These holdings were 
primarily based on the theory that the NCAA performed a 
government function and that there was a close nexus between 
the NCAA and the state.61 Courts focused on the fact that 
coordinating college athletics was an important part of education, 
and therefore a traditional government function, and that at 
least half of the members of the NCAA were public institutions.62 
Courts also focused on the "mutually beneficial relationship" 
between the public and private entities that formed the NCAA 
55 Kitchin, supra note 48, at 72. 
56 Carter, supra note 50, at 6-7. 
57 [d. at 28. 
58 [d. 
59 [d. at 38. 
60 Keegan, supra note 52, at 303. 
61 [d. at 303-04; see also John Sahl, College Athletes and Due Process Protection: 
What's Left After National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, 21 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 621, 642, 644 (1989). 
62 See Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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and the fact that state institutions wielded the majority of the 
power in the organization.63 Courts noted that state institutions, 
in addition to being a substantial portion of the NCAA's 
membership, were a major force in setting NCAA policy, and that 
the NCAA's actions had a governmental quality.64 
Lower courts backed away from holding the NCAA to be a 
state actor in the 1980s after the Supreme Court decided Blum, 
Rendell-Baker, and Lugar, all of which limited the application of 
the state action doctrine.65 Finally, in 1988, the Supreme Court 
decided Tarkanian66 and held by a margin of 5-4 that the NCAA 
was not engaged in state action when it required the University 
of Nevada Las Vegas ("UNLV'), a public institution, to fire its 
men's basketball coach, Jerry Tarkanian. Tarkanian brought 
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he had been deprived of 
his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights when the NCAA 
required UNLV to fire him based on the NCAA's findings of 
wrongdoing, or risk sanctions. The Court noted that UNLV, as 
an NCAA member, agreed to abide by NCAA bylaws and 
enforcement proceedings conducted pursuant to those bylaws. 
Accordingly, the NCAA conducted the investigation of Tarkanian 
and the administration of UNLV's men's basketball program. 
UNLV apparently resisted the NCAA inquiry and completed 
its own investigation. It was based on the NCAA's findings, 
however, that the NCAA required UNLV to sever all ties between 
Tarkanian and UNLV's athletic programs or risk additional 
sanctions. UNLV complied.67 
Tarkanian argued that, by essentially forcing UNLV to 
suspend him, the NCAA and UNLV were engaged in joint action 
sufficient to make the NCAA a state actor.68 Tarkanian argued 
that UNLV had basically delegated its authority to the NCAA to 
govern its athletic program and that it clothed the NCAA in 
63 See Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 219-20 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
64 [d. 
65 See Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1984); see also 
Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F.2d 258, 260 (6th Cir. 1987); Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 
953, 958 (6th Cir. 1986); Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602, 606-07 (C.D. Ill. 
1987); Kneeland v. NCAA, 650 F. Supp. 1047, 1055 (W.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd on other 
grounds, 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988); McHale v. Cornell Univ., 620 F. Supp. 67, 69-
70 (N.D.N.Y. 1985). 
66 488 U.S. 179 (1988). 
67 See id. at 180-87. 
68 See id. at 195, 196 n.16. 
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UNLV's state status. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating in a 
now famous phrase that the case required the court to "step 
through an analytical looking glass to resolve" it because of the 
"unique" situation it presented since the challenged action was 
not taken by a private actor, as in the usual state action case, but 
by UNLV, unquestionably an agent of the state.69 The Court 
then said that the inquiry came down to "whether 
UNLV's actions in compliance with the NCAA's rules and 
recommendations turned the NCAA's conduct into state action."70 
For several reasons, the Court found that it did not. Taking 
a formalistic approach, the Court noted that UNLV's influence on 
the NCAA rule-making process was too minor to clothe the 
NCAA in Nevada's state status because the NCAA was a huge 
organization with numerous members.71 Second, the Court found 
that the NCAA had no governmental power to undertake its 
investigation of UNLV.72 The Court also stressed that there 
could not be "joint action" sufficient to find state action since 
UNLV resisted the NCAA's investigation of Tarkanian and the 
basketball program and also had options other than compliance. 
Thus, the Court reasoned that UNLV did not have to follow the 
NCAA's mandate to sever ties with Tarkanian because it could 
have retained him and risked more severe sanctions or simply 
withdrawn from the NCAA.73 
The dissent argued that the state action situation presented 
by Tarkanian was not unique, but was in fact similar to prior 
cases where the Court found that private actors could be engaged 
in state action if they acted jointly with state officials in 
undertaking the challenged action. 74 The dissent explained that 
there was ample evidence of such joint action in Tarkanian 
because UNLV suspended Tarkanian based on violations of 
NCAA rules that UNLV agreed to follow. As a result, it was the 
69 See id. at 191-93. 
70 Id. at 193. 
71 See id. at 193, 195. 
72 Id. at 197. The Court cited its ruling in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. u. 
United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987), and reaffirmed that the 
regulation of amateur athletics is not a traditional public function. The Court stated 
that while it had previously found the administration of inter· collegiate athletics to 
be a "critical" function, it was not a "traditional, let alone an exclusive, state 
function." Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 198 n.18. 
73 See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 196 & n.16, 198. 
74 Id. at 200 (White, J., dissenting). 
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NCAA that conducted the investigation and hearings that formed 
the basis for Tarkanian's suspension, and the findings that came 
out of the investigation and subsequent hearings were binding on 
UNLV.75 The dissent stated that it was irrelevant that UNLV 
had the option to withdraw from the NCAA or that UNLV and 
the NCAA were adversaries throughout the investigation. What 
was important, the dissent stated, was that ultimately UNLV 
agreed with the NCAA to take action against Tarkanian.76 
Several states responded to the Tarkanian decision by 
introducing or adopting legislation that would provide 
individuals affected by NCAA investigations and sanctions with 
due process protections. 77 For instance, Nevada, Nebraska, 
Illinois, and Florida-all home to major NCAA Division I athletic 
programs-passed legislation that required the NCAA to provide 
those accused of rules violations with due process as specified in 
the statutes. 78 These statutes are now either no longer in effect 
or their effect is in serious doubt because courts have held that 
they violate the Commerce Clause. 79 The Supreme Court 
reaffirmed Tarkanian in 2001 in Brentwood 1.80 
The change from holding the NCAA to be a state actor, as 
the lower courts did, to finding it was not engaged in state action 
in Tarkanian, can be at least somewhat attributed to what 
commentators have called the "tremendous judicial deference 
and goodwill"81 that the NCAA has enjoyed in the regulation of 
intercollegiate athletics. The combination of the Tarkanian 
holding and lower court rulings that state statutes conferring due 
process protections on athletes and others caught in NCAA 
investigations violate the Commerce Clause means that the 
NCAA is not subject to constitutional limitations or state 
75 Id. at 200-02. 
76 See id. at 202-03. 
77 Keegan, supra note 52, at 319. 
78 Hearing, supra note 46, at 11-12 (statement of Gary R. Roberts, Deputy Dean 
and Director of the Sports Law Program, Tulane Law School). 
79 See Kitchin, supra note 48, at 77-78; see also NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 
637-38 (9th Cir. 1993) (invalidating a Nevada statute that sought to impose due 
process limitations on the actions of the NCAA because the NCAA was engaged in 
interstate commerce and the Nevada statute therefore would have directly regulated 
interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause). The Ninth Circuit also 
held that the statute must be struck down because its "extraterritorial effect" would 
subject the NCAA to "inconsistent obligations." Id. at 640. 
80 531 U.S. 288, 297-98 (2001). 
81 Carter, supra note 50, at 69. 
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statutes that attempt to establish due process protections for 
those involved in NCAA action.82 In a 2004 congressional 
hearing on the subject, Professor Gary Roberts explained that "it 
seems reasonably clear that ... the NCAA's enforcement process 
and procedures are unconstrained by either federal constitutional 
or state law. Thus, the question for Congress to consider is 
whether it would be appropriate for new federal legislation to 
impose any procedural requirements on the NCAA .... "83 Thus 
far, Congress has not adopted such legislation. 
2. The United States Olympic Committee-DeFrantz u. United 
States Olympic Committee and San Francisco Arts & 
Athletics, Inc. u. United States Olympic Committee 
Similar to the "deference" and "goodwill" shown to the 
NCAA, courts have shown great deference to the USOC in the 
application of the state action doctrine. The USOC enjoys this 
deference despite the fact that it is plainly not the usual "private" 
actor. 
Unlike many other countries, the United States does not 
have an official government agency or ministry for sports. This 
is because sports regulation has not traditionally been viewed as 
a government matter. Although sports regulation is not a formal 
part of our government structure, amateur sports issues 
increasingly have become important to the United States 
Government.84 The USOC, as it exists today, was first developed 
as a result of a Presidential Commission created in 1975 to study 
ways in which the United States could be more competitive in 
Olympic competition.85 The work of the Commission led to the 
Amateur Sports Act of 1978,86 which made the USOC a federally-
chartered corporation. The Act gave the USOC the exclusive 
82 See Hearing, supra note 46, at 11 (statement of Gary R. Roberts, Deputy 
Dean and Director of the Sports Law Program, Tulane Law School); see also Sahl, 
supra note 61, at 660-61. 
83 Hearing, supra note 46, at 12 (statement of Gary R. Roberts, Deputy Dean 
and Director of the Sports Law Program, Tulane Law School). 
84 Dionne L. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply to the Actions of the United 
States Anti.Doping Agency?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 91, 94 (2005). 
85 Exec. Order No. 11,868,40 Fed. Reg. 26,255 (June 23, 1975). 
86 Jimmy Carter, Amateur Sports Act of 1978: President's Statement on Signing 
S. 2727 into Law, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1976 (Nov. 8, 1978), available at http:// 
www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=30133; see also 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501-12, 
220521-29 (2000) (encompassing the codification of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978). 
2008] FROZEN IN TIME 197 
power to coordinate and govern Olympic Movement athletics in 
the United States.87 
The federal government exercises significant influence over 
the USOC. For instance, after the Soviet invasion of Mghanistan 
prior to the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow, President Carter 
and Congress called on the USOC to boycott the Games.88 The 
President, however, made clear that he would take all steps 
necessary to enforce his decision not to send a team to Moscow. 89 
Not surprisingly, the USOC voted not to send a team to the 
Games.90 These circumstances spawned the DeFrantz litigation, 
explained below. More recently, Congress has taken an interest 
in reforming the USOC in response to allegations of 
mismanagement and ethical violations, 91 and Congress made 
specific recommendations to the USOC to guide its 
reorganization. Thus, although the USOC operates in many 
ways as a private corporation, it is nevertheless subject to 
considerable government influence.92 As will be explained below, 
the federal government's influence over the USOC allowed 
Congress and the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
("ONDCP") to take the lead role in establishing the United States 
Anti-Doping Agency ("USADA"). 
Despite the strong government presence in the operation of 
the USOC generally and in specific circumstances, courts have 
ruled that the USOC is not a state actor. The first such case to 
87 See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 554 
(1987). 
88 Jeffrey M. Marks, Comment, Political Abuse of Olympic Sport-DeFrantz v. 
United States Olympic Committee, 14 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 155, 156 n.7 (1981-
82). 
89 Id. 
90 See DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1182-83 (D.D.C. 
1980) (declining to enjoin the USOC from carrying out its resolution of April 12, 
1980, not to send a team to Moscow). 
91 See Does the U.S. Olympic Committee's Organizational Structure Impede Its 
Mission?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer 
Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Congo (Mar. 19, 2003) 
(statement of William C. Martin, Acting President, U.S. Olympic Comm.). 
92 The federal government's influence over and interest in the USOC can also be 
seen in the actions of individual members of Congress who appear to have a personal 
interest in matters involving the Olympics. For instance, in litigation surrounding 
the selection of the 2000 Olympic Greco-Roman wrestling team, Senator Ted Stevens 
wrote a letter to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
weighing in on his interpretation of the Amateur Sports Act and which competitor 
should be sent to the Games to represent the United States. See Lindland V. U.S.A. 
Wrestling Ass'n, 227 F.3d 1000, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000). 
198 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82: 183 
do so, DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Committee, involved 
the United States' boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games.93 
The claim in DeFrantz was brought by a group of Olympic 
athletes who were selected to participate in the 1980 Moscow 
summer Olympic Games. Mter President Carter determined 
that the United States should not, and would not, send a team to 
Moscow, and the USOC voted not to do so, the athletes brought 
suit alleging that the USOC's action violated their rights under 
the Amateur Sports Act and the Constitution. 
The evidence indicated that President Carter and the 
"Administration strenuously urged a boycott of the Moscow 
games" as a sanction against the Soviet Union for its invasion of 
Mghanistan.94 As part of this effort, the President urged the 
International Olympic Committee to remove the Games from 
Moscow. He also announced in his State of the Union address 
that he would not support sending a United States team to 
compete in the Olympic Games as long as the Soviet military 
forces remained in Mghanistan. Moreover, the House of 
Representatives and Senate passed a resolution opposing 
participation in the Olympic Games by United States athletes. 
White House counsel met with the USOC Executive Board and 
other USOC officers and urged them to vote against sending a 
team to Moscow. President Carter also met with the Athlete's 
Advisory Council of the USOC and told them that the United 
States would not send a team to the Moscow Olympics. Finally, 
President Carter sent a message to the USOC and stated that he 
would take all legal action necessary to enforce his decision not to 
send a team to Moscow. 95 
Although there was considerable evidence that the federal 
government-and specifically President Carter-made the 
decision not to send a team to the 1980 Olympic Games, the court 
held that the President and federal government only held 
persuasive power over the USOC, but did not have sufficient 
"control" over the entity to justify a finding of state action. The 
court's analysis, however, focused relatively little on whether 
there was "a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the 
challenged action" as required by prior state action precedent, 
but instead looked at whether in general the federal government 
93 DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1193. 
94 Id. at 1183-84. 
95 Id. 
2008] FROZEN IN TIME 199 
had to approve the USOC's actions before they could be 
enforced.96 The court also noted that there was no "symbiotic 
relationship" between the federal government and the USOC 
because the USOC did not receive government funding. 
Significantly, the court explained that finding that the President 
and the government's efforts to influence the USOC to boycott 
the Games was sufficient for a finding of state action would 
open the door and usher the courts into what we believe is a 
largely nonjusticiable realm, where they would find themselves 
in the untenable position of determining whether a certain 
level, intensity, or type of "Presidential" or "Administration" or 
"political" pressure amounts to sufficient control over a private 
entity so as to invoke federal jurisdiction.97 
Given these concerns, the court clearly was not interested III 
performing a searching state action inquiry. Not surprisingly, 
the DeFrantz decision was criticized.98 
Mter DeFrantz, in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. u. 
United States Olympic Committee-a case that did not involve 
the Olympic Games or an Olympic Movement athlete-the 
Supreme Court ruled by a 5-4 margin that the USOC was not a 
state actor.99 In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, the USOC 
brought suit against San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. 
("SFAA"), an organization that was attempting to organize and 
promote the "Gay Olympic Games," to prohibit SF AA from using 
the word "Olympic" in its materials. lOo SFAA defended by 
arguing that its use of the Olympic mark was permissible under 
the Lanham Act, and that the USOC's enforcement of its 
exclusive right to the marks in this case violated the Fifth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause. lOl 
The Court rejected this challenge, holding that SFAA could 
not show state action.lo2 The Court explained that extensive 
regulation of a private entity "does not transform the actions of 
the regulated entity into those of the government."I03 Second, the 
Court stated that the USOC's receipt of government funding did 
96 Id. at 1193-94 (emphasis added). 
97 Id. at 1194. 
98 Marks, supra note 88, at 157. 
99 483 U.S. 522, 547-48 (1987). 
100 Id. at 525, 527. 
101 Id. at 530, 542. 
102 Id. at 544-45. 
103 Id. at 544. 
200 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:183 
not alter the analysis.104 ,. The Court stated that "[t]he 
Government may subsidize private entities without assuming 
constitutional responsibility for their actions."!05 Finally, the 
Court rejected the "public function" analysis, stating that while 
the USOC's activities served "a national interest," this fact was 
not enough to make the USOC's actions governmental action.lo6 
The Court stated that "[n]either the conduct nor the coordination 
of amateur sports has been a traditional governmental 
function."!07 Moreover, the Court explained that the facts did not 
show that the government "coerced or encouraged the USOC" in 
its decision to deny SF AA the use of the Olympic mark. lOB 
Justice Brennan's dissent argued that the USOC was a 
government actor under both the traditional government 
function analysis and the "close nexus" analysis. 109 The dissent 
noted that the USOC performs a "distinctive, traditional 
governmental function" by representing the United States to the 
world and explained that this function has become increasingly 
important as the Olympic Games have grown in importance. l1O 
The dissent used the example of the 1980 Olympic boycott to 
argue that the Olympics had an important place in American 
foreign policy, and that the 1980 experience "laid bare the impact 
and interrelationship of USOC decisions on the definition and 
pursuit of the national interest."l11 The dissent explained, 
however, that the function of the USOC was more than just 
representing the United States and its interests, but was also to 
perform a function that the private sector had never performed, 
which is to coordinate Olympic Movement sports. In doing this, 
the dissent noted, the USOC was endowed by Congress with 
unique authority to serve an important government interest, and 
in this way the federal government and the USOC exist in a 
"symbiotic relationship."112 Accordingly, the dissent noted that 
104 Id. 
105 Id. (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982». 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 545. 
108 Id. at 547. 
109 Id. at548-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
110 Id. at 550. 
III Id. at 551-53. 
112 Id. at 556-57 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 
(1961». 
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Congress put the "power and prestige of the United States 
Government" behind the USOC.113 
Like DeFrantz, San Francisco Arts & Athletics was criticized. 
As one commentator noted: "[I]n San Francisco Arts and 
Athletics, almost all types of Government involvement were 
existent and nevertheless, according to the majority stopped 
short of finding state action."114 The Court's unwillingness, in 
both Tarkanian and San Francisco Arts & Athletics, to find state 
action, even in the face of considerable evidence of state 
involvement in the challenged entities, solidified the notion that 
courts will not intrude in the affairs of amateur sports 
organizations by allowing constitutional challenges to their 
actions. This stance, as explained below, has opened the door to 
ever-increasing involvement by the state in amateur athletics. 
3. State High School Athletic Associations-Brentwood 
Academy u. Tennessee Secondary Schools Athletic Ass'n 
A notable exception to the general rule that the Constitution 
does not apply to entities involved with amateur athletics is the 
case of state high school athletic associations. A majority of cases 
hold that such associations are state actors, because in most 
cases they actually function as state agencies.115 Brentwood I 
involves a classic example of such an entity.116 In that case, the 
Supreme Court found that the Tennessee Secondary School 
Athletic Association (''TSSAA'') was engaged in state action in 
enforcing a recruiting rule against a private school member of the 
association. The TSSAA had been held to be a state actor in the 
past, when it was statutorily recognized as an instrumentality of 
the state. In response to that previous litigation, the statutory 
designation was changed, but little else about the workings of the 
113 Id. at 559. 
114 Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169, 1182 (1995); see also Buchanan, supra note 13, at 407 
(explaining that "[t]he opinion reveals little, if any, effort to consider the combined 
force of all relevant factors in relation to the state action issue"); Mitchell L. 
Beckloff, Comment, State Action in San Francisco Arts and Athletics, Inc. v. United 
States Olympic Committee: Let the Games Begin, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 635, 654 
(1989). 
115 Thomas A. Mayes, Comment, Tonya Harding's Case: Contractual Due 
Process, the Amateur Athlete, and the American Ideal of Fair Play, 3 UCLA ENT. L. 
REV. 109, 133 (1995). 
116 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n (Brentwood 1), 531 
U.S. 288, 290-92 (2001). 
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TSSAA did. The Supreme Court therefore held, by a margin of 5-
4, that the state ultimately was responsible for the decisions of 
the TSSAA because public officials were "pervasively entwined" 
in the management and control of the association.l17 
The Court found that the state was entwined with the 
TSSAA from the "top down" in that employees of the State Board 
of Education sat on many of the athletic association's committees, 
and employees of the athletic association were part of the state 
retirement system. us The state was also entwined from the 
"bottom up" in that an overwhelming majority of the members of 
the association were public high schools represented by school 
principals and others acting in their official capacities. u9 The 
Court noted that "[t]here would be no recognizable Association, 
legal or tangible, without the public school officials, who do not 
merely control but overwhelmingly perform all but the purely 
ministerial acts by which the Association exists and 
functions .... "120 The TSSAA argued that a finding of state 
action would have dire consequences for the association, as it 
would trigger an avalanche of litigation against the association 
that would impair significantly its ability to regulate athletics. 
The Court dismissed this argument, noting that "pleas for special 
treatment are hard to sell."121 
The dissent in Brentwood I was interesting not simply 
because it rejected the notion that "mere entwinement" could 
support a finding of state action;122 the dissent also took an 
analytical approach that differed from the approach taken by the 
majority in Tarkanian, where the Court rejected the state action 
argument. In Tarkanian, the Court focused heavily on the 
formal relationship between UNLV and the NCAA and gave little 
weight to the particulars of the action taken by the NCAA and 
UNLV against Tarkanian. Had the majority done so, the dissent 
in Tarkanian argued, a finding of state action under the "joint 
action" theory would necessarily have followed. In Brentwood I, 
the dissent advocated a different approach, looking less at the 
117 Id. at 298 ("The nominally private character of the [Athletic] Association is 
overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in 
its composition and workings .... "). 
llS Id. at 300. 
119 Id. at 299-300. 
120 Id. at 300. 
121 Id. at 305. 
122 Id. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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entity's relationship with the state, which the majority found 
inescapably evidenced state action, and instead analyzed the 
facts by explaining that the state had no involvement, under any 
theory, in the particular challenged action-the enforcement of 
the recruiting rule against Brentwood Academy. 
As a matter of state action jurisprudence, Brentwood I has 
been criticized as adding to the general incoherence of the 
doctrine by articulating yet another test for determining when 
the actions of a private entity have a sufficient nexus with the 
state to amount to state action.l23 Yet whatever it means for the 
state action doctrine generally, Brentwood I already has had an 
important impact in terms of the application of the state action 
doctrine to amateur sports.124 First, the Court in Brentwood I 
clearly signaled that it would not turn a blind eye to the clear 
presence of the state in a purportedly private organization. 125 It 
would not, the majority stated, be swayed by formal declarations 
of an entity's "private" status where it operates, through "winks 
and nods," in concert with the state.l26 This is significant 
because, in the amateur sports context, there are many such 
"winks and nods." Yet, while the Court signaled it may be more 
willing to look behind amateur sports regulators' assertion of 
"private" status, it also contributed to the static conception of the 
NCAA as a private actor by reaffirming Tarkanian. As will be 
discussed below, "freezing" the status of the NCAA and the 
USOC has had important consequences. 
123 Id. at 303. 
124 The state action holding was not examined by the Supreme Court in the 
recently-announced decision in Brentwood II, which considered the merits of the 
First Amendment challenge to one of the TSSAA's recruiting rules, although Justice 
Thomas stated in his concurring opinion that he would have overruled Brentwood I 
because it "departed so dramatically from our earlier state action cases." Tenn. 
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct. 2489, 
2499 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
125 The Brentwood I majority noted that the state "once freely acknowledged the 
Association's official character but now does it by winks and nods." Brentwood 1,531 
U.S. at 301. It went on to add that the "significance of winks and nods in state action 
doctrine" was one of the areas where the dissent disagreed with the majority, 
explaining that the dissent preferred a more formalistic approach to the analysis, 
rather than one based on "practical certainty." Id. at 301 nA. The majority stated 
that "if formalism were the sine qua non of state action, the doctrine would vanish 
owing to the ease and inevitability of its evasion, and for just that reason formalism 
has never been controlling." Id. 
126 Id. at 301. 
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II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE STATE ACTION-AMATEUR 
SPORT CASES 
It might be assumed that the obvious consequence of the 
state action-amateur sport cases is that, consistent with the goals 
of the state action doctrine, the liberty of sports regulators such 
as the USOC and the NCAA is enhanced because courts are not 
imposing constitutional requirements on their actions. That is, 
the government, in the form of the judicial branch, is not 
intruding on the "private" realm of amateur sports regulation. 
To some extent, the state action-amateur sport cases achieve 
these goals. Amateur sports organizations, like the USOC and 
the NCAA, are free to manage the athletes and athletic 
competitions within their respective jurisdictions without fear of 
constitutional litigation. They can give athletes and others the 
due process of their own design without considering whether 
such procedures would pass constitutional muster. Giving sports 
organizations "room" in this regard can be important, so that 
the rules of the game, so to speak, prevail. This beneficial 
consequence is underscored by amateur sports regulators, who 
commonly assert that there would be dire consequences if the 
state action doctrine were applied to allow constitutional 
litigation to go forward against them. 127 Such consequences, 
amateur sports organizations assert, would include a wave of 
litigation that would destroy the entities' budgets and render 
them incapable of effectively regulating athletics. 128 These 
predictions of disaster, while found to be unconvincing by the 
Court in Brentwood I, may contribute significantly to courts' 
unwillingness to hold that amateur sports organizations are 
engaged in state action. 
Yet while doomsday consequences of a state action finding 
are frequently predicted by amateur sports organizations, what 
is not examined are the actual consequences of holding that 
entities such as the NCAA and the USOC are private actors. As 
explained below, a closer look at the consequences of San 
Francisco Arts & Athletics and Tarkanian reveals not that the 
"private realm" of amateur athletics has been protected and 
127 See id. at 304 (citing Brief for Respondents at 35, Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. 
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 532 U.S. 288 (2001) (No. 99-901». 
128 Such an argument is frequently made in the anti-doping context, where it is 
commonly believed that constitutional litigation would significantly weaken an 
entity like the USADA because of the costs involved. 
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enhanced, but that there has been a quite different and 
paradoxical result. 
A. The Constitutional Status of Amateur Sports Organizations 
Has Been ''Frozen'' 
Commentators have noted that "[n]ew forms of governmental 
activities ... change the reality of state actions."129 This has 
certainly been the case with amateur sports, where the 
increasing role of the government has changed the reality of state 
involvement. Yet, the law has not, and under current 
formulations will not, keep up with this changed reality. 
Instead, what has happened is precisely what Justice Brennan 
foreshadowed in his dissent in San Francisco Arts & Athletics. 
Justice Brennan warned that a narrow interpretation of the state 
action doctrine would, in essence, "freeze into law a static 
conception of government," so that "our judicial theory of 
government action would cease to resemble contemporary., 
experience."130 Indeed, this "freezing," to a large extent, has" 
occurred in the area of amateur sports, where a powerful ripple 
effect was created by the decisions in Tarkanian, DeFrantz, and 
San Francisco Arts & Athletics. 131 Lower courts and legal 
scholars have assumed that the USOC and the NCAA are not 
state actors as a matter of law.l32 Thus, common wisdom that the· 
129 Barak-Erez, supra note 114, at 119l. 
130 S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 549 n.l 
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
131 Interestingly, this "freezing" seems only to operate one way. There does not 
seem to be any notion that Brentwood I, which held a high school athletic association 
to be a state actor, has frozen a conception of all high school athletic associations as 
public actors as a matter of law. Indeed, the TSSAA is still litigating the state action 
issue, asking the Supreme Court to overrule its previous finding that it was a state 
actor when it sanctioned member-school Brentwood Academy. 
132 See, e.g., Harding v. U.S. Figure Skating Ass'n, 851 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 (D. 
Or. 1994), vacated, 879 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Or. 1995); Beckloff, supra note 114, at 
644--45; Douglas Bryant, Comment, A Level Playing Field? The NCAA's Freshman 
Eligibility Standards Violate Title VI, but the Problems Can Be Solved, 32 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 305, 325 (2001); Carter, supra note 50, at 80; Michael G. Dawson, 
Note, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian: Supreme Court Upholds 
NCAA's Private Status Under Fourteenth Amendment, Repelling Shark's Attack on 
NCAA's Disciplinary Powers, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 217, 235-36 (1989); Amanda N. 
Luftman, Comment, Does the NCAA's Football Rule 9-2 Impede the Free Exercise of 
Religion on the Playing Field?, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 445, 448 (1995); Mayes, 
supra note 115, at 130-31; Paul C. McCaffrey, Note, Playing Fair: Why the United 
States Anti-Doping Agency's Performance-Enhanced Adjudications Should Be 
Treated as State Action, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 645,667 (2006). 
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USOC and the NCAA are "private" has evolved to be a static, 
settled principle of law. This static view of the state action 
doctrine prevents the law from accounting for an increased 
government presence in amateur athletic regulation. This view 
also has acted as a virtual invitation to the government to 
exercise increasing levels of involvement in amateur sports 
without corresponding constitutional restraints, as a means of 
promoting government policies. Therefore, the current 
application of the state action doctrine to amateur sports 
organizations undermines their legitimacy more than it enhances 
their liberty. 
The Supreme Court's formulation of the state action doctrine 
seems to negate the possibility of "freezing" a conception of an 
entity and its relationship with the government, such that the 
entity can be held as a matter of law to be, or not be, a 
state actor. The Court has stated that the state action inquiry 
is "necessarily fact-bound,"133 and that the state action 
determination can only be conducted by "sifting facts and 
weighing circumstances."134 The Court has also stressed that no 
one set of facts or circumstances is sufficient to find state 
action. 135 Finally, there are several different theories upon which 
state action can be found and the Supreme Court has emphasized 
that it is not relevant whether state action might be lacking 
under certain theories if there is at least one that is sufficient. 136 
Despite these admonitions, however, the state-action amateur 
sport cases are generally interpreted as establishing the NCAA 
and USOC's constitutional status as a matter of law. 
1. The Static Conception of the NCAA 
It has been "universally accepted" 
established that the NCAA is not a state 
constitutional limitations. 137 Tarkanian was 
that Tarkanian 
actor subject to 
decided in 1988, 
133 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n (Brentwood l), 531 
U.S. 288, 298 (2001) (quoting Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982». 
134 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). 
135 Brentwood I, 531 U.s. at 295-96; see also Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger 
Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) ("The Constitution constrains governmental action 
'by whatever instruments or in whatever modes that action may be taken.''' (quoting 
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,346-47 (1880»). 
136 Brentwood I, 531 U.S. at 295-96. 
137 Hearing, supra note 46, at 11 (statement of Prof. Gary Roberts); see also 
Matthews v. NCAA, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1207 (E.D. Wash. 1999); Bloom v. NCAA, 
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and, since that time, several facts have changed that make a 
static conception of the NCAA's constitutional status particularly 
troubling. First, as explained in great detail by Burlette Carter, 
the NCAA has undergone significant restructuring in that time, 
so that the association's governance structure, which was in 
place and significant to the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Tarkanian, is now gone. 138 Professor Carter makes a compelling 
case for re-examining the NCAA's constitutional status based on 
this dramatic restructuring, stating that "there now seems a very 
good argument that state power has been delegated by public 
institutions to the NCAA, at least in the case of Division 1."139 
Professor Carter also convincingly argues that state action could 
be found on a theory of joint action. 140 
Also changed is our understanding of the student-
athlete experience and the interests that are at stake for those 
who participate in NCAA-regulated sports.141 Numerous 
commentators have asserted that the due process protections 
offered to student-athletes are terribly inadequate given the 
interests that are at stake. 142 Yet, the universal acceptance of 
the NCAA as a private actor means that student-athletes have 
very little meaningful legal recourse. This is because, since 
Tarkanian, the constitutional status of the NCAA and the facts 
underlying its operations have been taken by courts "as law 
93 P.3d 621,624 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). 
138 Carter, supra note 50, at 27, 39. In the petitioner's brief in Tarkanian, it was 
explained that "the general policies and all rules of the Association are voted on by 
the member institutions at annual conventions. Each member is entitled to one vote 
in matters voted on at Association meetings" to show that the influence of state 
institutions is diminished because every institution, public or private, is entitled to 
the same amount of authority over the rule-making process. Brief for the Petitioner 
at 4, NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (No. 87-1061). Burlette Carter 
explains, however, that this is no longer the case. 
139 Carter, supra note 50, at 85. Professor Carter argues that NCAA 
restructuring will have its "most wide-ranging effect" on the state action issue, 
because in Tarkanian, the Court relied on the fact that NCAA policies were 
established by a one-member, one-vote system, so that for any given policy, "several 
hundred" other institutions in addition to UNLV established it. Now, however, with 
restructuring, the authority to set NCAA policy is controlled at the Divisional level, 
so that, for instance, Division I members delegate authority to the Division I Board 
of Directors and Management Council to set policy. Id. at 81-82. 
140 Id. at 86. 
141 See generally Timothy Davis, Student-Athlete Economic Interests: 
Contractual Dimensions, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 585 (1994); Sahl, supra note 61. 
142 See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 46, at 4-5 (statement of Rep. Spencer Bachus, 
Member, House Subcomm. on the Constitution). 
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itself."143 Accordingly, there have been no successful state action 
challenges to the NCAA since Tarkanian was decided. 
2. The Static Conception of the USOC 
Similar to freezing the constitutional status of the NCAA, 
the status of the USOC is widely assumed to be that of a private 
~'actor, not subject to constitutional restraint due to the decisions 
in San Francisco Arts & Athletics and DeFrantz. Aside from the 
fact that such "freezing" is inappropriate according to the terms 
of the state action doctrine itself, it is particularly problematic in 
the case of the USOC because its "private" status was 
determined in cases where the state action issue was litigated in 
a limited way. 
In DeFrantz, as discussed above, the case was litigated in the 
sensitive aftermath of the former Soviet Union's invasion of 
Mghanistan. The call to boycott the Olympic Games upon which 
the claim in DeFrantz was made was a significant feature of the 
Carter Administration's foreign policy response to the invasion. 
The court's scrutiny of the involvement of the federal government 
in the USOC's decision to boycott reveals that the court engaged 
in a limited analysis of the issue. Noting that there was no 
symbiotic relationship or close nexus between the federal 
government and the USOC, the court concluded that the 
plaintiffs, in essence, had to satisfy a higher burden to prove 
state action because the case did not involve discrimination on 
the basis of race. 144 The Supreme Court, however, has never 
imposed such a heightened requirement. Failing this version of 
the state action inquiry, the district court in DeFrantz ruled 
against the athletes, concluding that there was no state action. 
The court tellingly noted that a finding of state action would 
,necessarily involve the court in a "non-justiciable" area. 
143 Carter, supra note 50, at 80. 
144 DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1194 (D. D.C. 1980). 
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Like DeFrantz,145 San Francisco Arts & Athletics seems to be 
a weak case from which to draw the conclusion that the USOC is 
not a state actor as a matter of law. First, the state action issue 
was not central to the parties' arguments. The case focused 
primarily on statutory claims related to the use of the Olympic 
trademark. Additionally, the case did not involve a dispute 
related to Olympic Movement sports or an Olympic Movement 
athlete. Moreover, the state action holding in San Francisco Arts 
& Athletics is simply not broad enough to support the conclusion 
that the USOC is not a state actor as a matter oflaw. The Court 
held that the USOC is not a state actor under the "traditional 
public function" theory because the USOC does not perform 
functions that were traditionally the "exclusive prerogative" of 
the government. This theory was SFAA's primary argument for 
state action, as it was unable to show that the challenged action, 
the denial of the use of the Olympic mark, was the product of 
joint action, coercion, or significant encouragement by the United 
States Government.146 Indeed, SF AA could not show that the 
action of denying the use of the mark had any nexus at all to the 
federal government. Yet, despite the seemingly narrow ruling in 
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, it is generally taken as fact that 
the USOC is not a state actor. As with the NCAA, there appears 
to have been few if any constitutional challenges to the USOC 
since the decisions in DeFrantz and San Francisco Arts & 
Athletics. 
145 Given the highly unique circumstances of DeFrantz, and the limited state 
action analysis that resulted, DeFrantz would seem like a poor case upon which to 
build a conclusion that the USOC is not a state actor as a matter of law. However, 
this is just the effect that it had in San Francisco Arts & Athletics. An analysis of the 
parties' briefs and the opinion in San Francisco Arts & Athletics shows the power of 
the state action bootstrapping that has taken place. An important part of the 
argument and holding that the USOC was not a state actor in San Francisco Arts & 
Athletics was that it had been held not to be a state actor in DeFrantz. See S.F. Arts 
& Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 545 n.27 (1987) (noting that 
"even the unique sequence of events in 1980 confirms that the USOC cannot 
properly be considered a governmental agency" was quoted extensively from the 
opinion in DeFrantz and explained that the District Court in that case found there 
was no state action); see also Brief for Respondents at 45, S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. 
v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (No. 86-270) (citing DeFrantz for the 
proposition that the USOC is not subject to constitutional restrictions). 
146 See Koller, supra note 84, at 118-19. 
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B. The State Action-Amateur Sport Cases Invite Increased State 
Involvement in Amateur Athletics: The Case of the United 
States Anti-Doping Agency 
The "freezing" of the law's conception of the NCAA and the 
USOC as private actors has had important consequences beyond 
the fact that it has chilled constitutional litigation against the 
NCAA and the USOC. The effect goes even further, by not only 
deterring potential litigation, but also inviting increased state 
involvement in amateur athletics without constitutional 
constraints. 147 This effect can clearly be seen in the formation 
and operation of the United States Anti-Doping Agency 
("USADA"). 
Scholars have criticized the Supreme Court's narrow 
interpretation of the state action doctrine by noting that it comes 
at a time of increased "privatization" of traditional government 
programs. 148 Of particular concern is the government enlisting 
private entities to implement government programs or provide 
services on the government's behalf.149 Changes to Medicare and 
Medicaid, welfare, and public education programs, among others, 
are examples of increased "privatization."15o Privatization can 
therefore take the form of contracting out traditionally-provided 
government services, as was the case in Blum and Rendell-Baker, 
or privatizing traditional public services such as utilities or 
transportation.l51 The resulting exercises of government power 
through ostensibly private hands are not subject to constitutional 
scrutiny because of the current formulation of the state action 
doctrine. 152 Thus, it has been argued that the "old tests" for state 
147 This Article does not argue that increased state involvement in amateur 
athletics is by itself improper or unwarranted. Instead, this Article makes the point 
that it is state involvement without corresponding constitutional limitations that is 
problematic. 
148 Barak-Erez, supra note 114, at 1183; Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal 
Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569, 587-89 (2001); 
Metzger, supra note 19, at 1457-60; Paul R. Verkuil, Privatizing Due Process, 57 
ADMIN. L. REV. 963, 987 (2005). 
149 William Brooks, The Privatization of the Civil Commitment Process and the 
State Action Doctrine: Have the Mentally III Been Systematically Stripped of Their 
Fourteenth Amendment Rights?, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 6 (2001); Metzger, supra note 19, 
at 1370. 
150 Metzger, supra note 19, at 1369, 1382. 
151 Barak-Erez, supra note 114, at 1183. 
152 Metzger, supra note 19, at 1373. 
2008] FROZEN IN TIME 211 
action are not keeping up with new governmental realities.153 
These new governmental realities go beyond the trend towards 
"privatization." In the amateur sports context, the new 
governmental reality is increasing state power in a traditionally 
private area. This clearly can be seen in the formation of the 
USADA, whose creation was through the efforts of the federal 
government for the purpose of promoting federal anti-drug policy 
goals. 
In the past, prohibiting performance-enhancing drug use in 
sports was not a government concern. Barrie Houlihan has 
examined the "transition" of anti-doping efforts "from a private 
matter to a public policy issue."154 While describing the United 
States Government as traditionally "apathetic" on the issue of 
doping, Houlihan states that the "United States Government, 
which had for many years studiously avoided acknowledging the 
issue of doping in sport," emerged in the late 1990's as a "leading 
supporter ... of a more rigorous anti-doping regime."155 This 
interest in anti-doping was a result of many factors, including 
persistent reports of performance-enhancing drug use by elite 
- athletes and the fact that the government believed such use was 
leading to an increase in performance-enhancing drug use, 
including steroids, by young people. 156 It was not just steroid use 
by Olympic Movement athletes that concerned the government, 
but use of such drugs by professional athletes as well.l57 Many 
within the United States Government believed that the 
government had a responsibility to undertake domestic and 
international efforts to "strengthen anti-doping regimes."158 
Building a domestic anti-doping "regime," however, required 
153 Barak-Erez, supra note 114, at 1186. 
154 Barrie Houlihan, Building an International Regime to Combat Doping in 
Sport, in SPORT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: AN EMERGING RELATIONSHIP 62, 
62 (Roger Levermore & Adrian Budd eds., 2004). 
155 Id. at 64, 72. 
156 Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs on the Health of Athletes and 
Athletic Competition: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, 106th Congo 95 (1999) [hereinafter Hearing on the Effects of 
Performance Enhancing Drugs] (statement 9f Sen. John McCain, Member, S. Comm. 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation). 
157 See generally Steroids in Amateur and Professional Sports-The Medical and 
Social Costs of Steroid Abuse: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, WIst 
Congo (1989). 
158 Hearing on the Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs, supra note 156, at 
20 (statement of Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey). 
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uniquely "state" resources. 159 Accordingly, many members of 
Congress and the Executive Branch made it a policy objective to 
fight doping in sports, resulting in the creation of the USADA.160 
The USADA became functional on October 1, 2000,161 
designated by Congress as the United States' "official" anti-
doping agency. The USADA was created as a private, not-for-
profit corporation, which undertakes its duties pursuant to a 
contract with the USOC to administer the United States' drug 
testing programs. 162 The USADA receives the vast majority of its 
funding from the United States Government through the Office 
of National Drug Control Policy ("ONDCP").163 The USADA's 
mission is to preserve "the well-being of Olympic sport, the 
integrity of competition, and ensur[e] the health of athletes."164 
In addition to its Olympic Movement duties, there have been a 
variety of proposals in Congress that would involve the USADA 
in drug testing programs for professional sports leagues and the 
NCAA. 165 
The need for state resources and the authority to combat 
doping, coupled with the constitutional limits that state power 
entails, provided a challenging situation for the government 
officials who hoped to combat doping through the power of the 
state. On the one hand, to be effective, officials believed an anti-
doping entity had to have United States Government status. 
Initially, it was contemplated by the government officials 
involved in forming the USADA that it would need to 
be an actual government agency to be effective. 166 Officials 
envisioned a "U.S. agency" with "certain governmental or quasi-
159 Houlihan, supra note 154, at 68. 
160 Koller, supra note 84, at 103, 105. 
161 U.S. Anti.Doping Agency History, http://www.usantidoping.org/who/history. 
html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
162 Travis T. Tygart, Winners Never Dope and Finally, Dopers Never Win: 
USADA Takes Over Drug Testing of United States Olympic Athletes, 1 DEPAUL J. 
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 124, 127-28 (2003). 
163 Koller, supra note 84, at 129. 
164 U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2005), http://www.us 
antidoping.org/files/active/who/annuaIJeport_2004.pdf. 
165 S. 1114, The Clean Sports Act of 2005, and S. 1334, The Professional Sports 
Integrity and Accountability Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, 109th Congo 39 (2005) (statement of Gary Bettman, 
Commissioner, National Hockey League); see also id. at 65 (statement of Frank D. 
Uryasz, President, The National Center for Drug Free Sport, Inc.). 
166 See Koller, supra note 84, at 114-16. 
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governmental powers,"167 or at least "some instrumentality of the 
United States' status."168 It was asserted that governmental 
status would improve the accountability of anti-doping efforts 
and significantly enhance the credibility of the United States.169 
On the other hand, however, there were concerns that the 
United States would not be able to establish an effective anti-
doping agency because of constitutional rights of privacy and due 
process. 170 Indeed, at least some government officials hoped to 
limit due process protections for accused athletes so that the 
athlete could be removed from competition before having a 
chance to defend him or herself.l71 Some even questioned 
whether there was a place for "fundamental notions of due 
process" in the fight against doping.172 This is the prevailing 
view among anti-doping advocates-that, to be effective, 
authorities must stay one step ahead of the cheaters.173 One of 
the ways doping authorities stay "one step ahead" is through the 
administration of an anti-doping regime, the World Anti-Doping 
Code, which was developed through the World Anti-Doping 
Agency with significant input and influence from the United 
StatesY4 Under these regulations, doping is a strict liability 
offense, and authorities need only prove their claim based on the 
"comfortable satisfaction" of regulators, not ''beyond a reasonable 
doubt."175 Using this standard, the USADA announced that it 
had eliminated the requirement that an athlete actually fail a 
167 Hearing on the Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs, supra note 156, at 
20 (statement of Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey). 
168 WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON DRUG USE IN SPORTS, PROCEEDINGS: FIRST 
MEETING OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON DRUG USE IN SPORTS 83 (2000) 
[hereinafter WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON DRUG USE IN SPORTS]. 
169 Hearing on the Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs, supra note 156, at 
20 (statement of Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey). 
170 See WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON DRUG USE IN SPORTS, supra note 168, at 
7 (statement of Barry R. McCaffrey). 
171 See id. at 35 (open discussion response of Mickey Ibarra). 
172 [d. at 56 (remarks of Scott Blackmun). 
173 See Laura S. Stewart, Comment, Has the United States Anti-Doping Agency 
Gone Too Far? Analyzing the Shift from 'Beyond a Reasonable Doubt' to Comfortable 
Satisfaction, 13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 207, 227 (2006); see also Amy Shipley, A 
Wider Front in Doping Battle: Law Enforcement Takes the Lead in Sports Probes, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2007, at A01 ("In an environment in which the athletes who 
use illegal performance-enhancing substances seem routinely to be at least one step 
ahead of drug testers, efforts are underway to strengthen the relationship between 
sports bodies and law enforcement officials."). 
174 Koller, supra note 84, at 100, 103-04. 
175 Stewart, supra note 173, at 225. 
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drug test before being sanctioned. Instead, the USADA asserted 
that it can sanction an athlete based on a "non-analytical 
positive," which is circumstantial evidence of doping "to the 
comfortable satisfaction" of regulators.176 Critics have argued 
that this level of proof for a doping violation has the possibility of 
being "unreliable and unfair,"177 especially coupled with the stiff 
penalties and difficult procedural hurdles for accused athletes. 
Athletes have few legal options, outside of arbitration, if they 
believe the process was unfair.178 Such a system, if administered 
by the state, could trigger constitutional privacy and due process 
protections. 
This fact is not lost on those both within and outside of the 
government who wish to fight doping in sports. Therefore, 
instead of simply creating a government agency to fight doping, 
members of Congress and the ONDCP worked to establish an 
entity that would not be subject to constitutional limitations. 
Congress and the ONDCP did this by using their influence over 
the USOC, which had been declared by the Supreme Court in 
San Francisco Arts & Athletics to be a private entity, to direct it 
to establish the USADA.179 Thus, officially, the USADA states it 
was created by the USOC.180 However, the impetus for and effort 
to create the USADA was from the ONDCP and Congress, both of 
which provided the blueprint and funding for what the USADA 
became. 181 
Since its formation, members of Congress and the Executive 
Branch have been significantly involved in key areas of the 
USADA's operation. For instance, in the months leading up to 
the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, the government used its 
subpoena power to aid a USADA investigation and prevent 
certain athletes from competing in the Games.l82 Specifically, 
176 Koller, supra note 174, at 93, 111. The USADA has in fact sanctioned several 
athletes using the "non-analytical positive" standard. Id. at 93. 
177 James A.R. Nafziger, Circumstantial Evidence of Doping: BALCO and 
Beyond, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 45, 47 (2005). 
178 See Stewart, supra note 173, at 242. 
179 See Hearing on the Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs, supra note 156, 
at 20 (statement of Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey); see also WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE 
ON DRUG USE IN SPORTS, supra note 168, at 15 (remarks of Frank Shorter). 
180 U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2002), http://www. 
usantidoping.org/files/active/who/annual_reporC2001.pdf. 
181 See Hearing on the Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs, supra note 156, 
at 20 (statement of Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey). 
182 See Owen Slot, United States Risks Losing Race Against Time to Keep Athens 
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government officials were concerned that track and field athletes 
implicated in the Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative ("BALCO") 
scandal might compete in Athens. Yet without the information 
from the BALCO grand jury investigation, USADA was unable to 
bring doping cases against those who may have used previously-
undetectable performance-enhancing drugs. Accordingly, to 
prevent any BALCO-tainted athletes from going to Athens, a 
Senate Committee subpoenaed documents from the Department 
of Justice that were part of the ongoing BALCO investigation. 183 
The Senate, in what was termed an "unprecedented action"184 
subsequently turned the material over to USADAI85 
The BALCO scandal was not an isolated incident. In fact, 
the USADA regularly works with the government to develop 
evidence and pursue sanctions against athletes. For instance, 
the USADA recently has worked with federal agents as part of a 
multi-state investigation and bust of an operation that sold 
steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs through the 
internet, and they apparently are working with the government 
on several other investigations.186 It is contemplated that, just as 
it did with the BALCO scandal, the government will provide any 
evidence of purchases by Olympic Movement athletes so that the 
USADA can take action to sanction them. 187 This collaboration 
has yielded results that the USADA simply could not achieve on 
its own.l88 In addition, in 2004, the United States Attorney 
involved in the BALCO case gave permission to one of the 
investigators in the case to testify at hearings in which USADA 
was seeking to ban from competition athletes who had never 
failed a drug test. The United States Attorney allowed the 
Clean, U.K. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004, at 46. 
183 Press Release, Sen. John McCain, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Commerce, 
Science, and Transp., Committee to Subpoena DOJ Documents Relating to Banned 
Substance Use in Olympics (Apr. 8, 2004). 
184 S. 529: To Authorize Appropriations for the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 109th Corig. 
(2005) (opening statement of Ted Stevens, Chairman, U.S. Anti-Doping Agency). 
185 S. Res. 355, 108th Congo (2004) (enacted). 
186 See Shipley, supra note 173, at AOl. 
187 See id. 
188 See id. (explaining that doping authorities do not have reliable tests for 
agents such as human growth hormone and other performance-enhancing agents so 
that they must rely on evidence developed from government investigations). " 'If you 
look at the really big busts, the really big advances, the majority have been with the 
assistance of other government agencies ... .''' Id. (quoting W ADA Director, Gen. 
David Howman). 
216 ST. JOHN'S LA W REVIEW [Vol. 82:183 
investigator to use at the hearings original documents from the 
investigation so that their authenticity could not be challenged, 
and so that the USADA could win its case. The United States 
Attorney acknowledged that such a move was "unique" because 
the criminal investigation was still ongoing, but that partnering 
with the USADA was part of an effort to "help them in their 
mission."189 Moreover, the blurred line between the government 
and the USADA is illustrated by the fact that when athletes who 
test positive for use of a banned substance agree to assist the 
government in steroid-related investigations, the USADA offers 
them a lesser penalty.l90 As one anti-doping official stated, the 
government's assistance in USADA's operations has caused a 
"revolution" in the anti-doping movement, as "sports authorities 
have no power to do anything and government has the power to 
do all. That's what it takes."191 
It is this "difference" that is made by the government using 
its tools against individuals that is supposed to trigger 
constitutional protections. Yet, while nothing should preclude a 
finding of state action against the USADA, such a finding, under 
current state action-amateur sports jurisprudence, is not 
likely. 192 The USADA's position is that, like the USOC, it is a 
"private" actor. Given the static conception of both the USOC 
and the NCAA as "private" actors, the state action precedent is 
particularly powerful. It not only arguably protects USADA's 
"private" status, it protects the government's ability to fight 
doping in the manner it deems most effective: using the power 
and status of the state to combat doping, while avoiding the 
. unpleasant side-effects of constitutional litigation. Thus, while 
the state action-sport cases do limit the reach of "federal judicial 
power," according to one of the asserted goals of the state action 
doctrine, it certainly does not limit the reach of government 
189 [d. (quoting Matt Parrella, an assistant U.S. attorney assigned to the 
BALCO case). 
190 Cf Amy Shipley, Gatlin Will Claim Sabotage in Defense of Doping Charges, 
WASH. POST, July 30,2007, at EOl. 
191 Shipley, supra note 173, at A01 (noting that government "tools" make the 
difference in the anti· doping effort). "'When I look at the 23 years of work before 
Balco and what we were able to do--yeah, we would grind out positives and 
occasionally have a big hit-but when the government ... decides to go after it and 
comes in with their tools ... [t]hey (wiretap), they pull out e-mails; I was amazed.' " 
[d. (quoting Don Catlin, Director of UCLA's Olympic Analytical Laboratory). 
192 See Koller, supra note 84, at 116. 
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power exercised through the executive and legislative branches. 
This fact has a cost, as explained below, in that it undermines 
the legitimacy of our most important amateur sports 
organizations. 
C. The "Frozen" Status of the NCAA and USOC Undermines 
Their Legitimacy 
The conclusion that the NCAA and the USOC were private 
actors in San Francisco Arts & Athletics and Tarkanian, and the 
static conception of these entities that has followed, directly 
collides with the perception that the USOC and NCAA regulate 
athletes through and with the power of the state. This 
perception undermines the legitimacy of these organizations in a 
way that allowing constitutional litigation against them to go 
forward would not. 
1. Amateur Athletic Regulation Is Perceived to Be Unfair 
Amateur sport is a tempting target for government 
influence, because of its high profile nature, appeals to 
nationalism, and commercial importance. As a result, the NCAA, 
USOC, and now the USADA are far from being simply "private," 
but instead operate with significant government presence and 
influence. This dissonance between the notion that the USOC 
and the NCAA are private as a matter of law and the perceived 
reality of the state's presence in their activities undermines the 
legitimacy of their regulation193 because the USOC and the 
NCAA, and now the USADA, are perceived to have an unfair 
advantage over the athletes and others they regulate-the 
backing of the government. 
To some extent, the legitimacy problems brought on by the 
state action-amateur sports cases begin with the reasoning of the 
decisions themselves, which emphasize a formalistic analysis of 
the structure of the NCAA and the USOC, and not the practical 
193 It could be argued that Brentwood I went a long way to curing some of the 
legitimacy problems created by the state action-amateur sport cases, by holding the 
obviously state-influenced TSSAA to constitutional standards. See Brentwood Acad. 
v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n (Brentwood 1), 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001). 
However, in that case, the Court also reaffirmed the conclusion in Tarkanian. See id. 
at 297-98. Moreover, in Brentwood II, one Justice said the state action ruling was 
wrong and should be over-turned. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. 
Athletic Ass'n (Brentwood ll), 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2499 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in the jUdgment). 
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realities of how these entities operate. 194 For instance, of 
significance to the Court in Tarkanian was the fact that UNL V 
could simply have refused to sanction Tarkanian according to the 
NCAA's demands and withdrawn from the NCAA. Although the 
dissent pointed out that such a reason was not legally sufficient 
to defeat a finding of state action,195 the reasoning itself was not 
factually sound in terms of the NCAA's virtual monopoly over 
inter-collegiate athletic competition. Pulling out of the NCAA 
would essentially have cost the university its athletic programs 
and millions of dollars of lost television and marketing revenue, 
something no university would risk. 
Moreover, the Court's emphasis on the formal structure of 
UNLV's relationship with the NCAA ignored the practical 
realities of the challenged action. The facts in Tarkanian 
indicated that public universities had a great deal to do with the 
actions taken against Coach Tarkanian. The Committee on 
Infractions and the NCAA Council were responsible for the 
sanctions. Four out of five members of the Committee on 
Infractions were representatives of public universities,196 and 
eleven out of sixteen members of the NCAA Council were 
representatives from public universities. By turning a blind eye 
to these facts, the Supreme Court contributed to what one 
commentator has explained is "a long-held perception of those 
involved in intercollegiate athletics ... that the NCAA has 
exercised unfettered discretion in regulating college sports."197 
Moreover, as stated during a 2004 hearing on Due Process and 
the NCAA, "Merited or not, the NCAA has at least the perception 
of a fairness problem."198 
Likewise, the Court's steadfast refusal, in San Francisco 
Arts & Athletics, to acknowledge the unique importance of the 
USOC to the federal government, and its unique status within 
the governmental orbit was, again, a refusal to acknowledge 
194 Such a "disconnect" between the state action doctrine and political and social 
realities is, as some critics have argued, a problem with the doctrine itself. As 
Charles Black asserted, the doctrine fails to account for "the wonderfully variegated 
ways in which the Briarean state can put its hundred hands on life." Black, supra 
note 38, at 89. 
195 NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 202-03 (1988) (White, J., dissenting). 
196 Id. at 185 (majority opinion). 
197 Arslanian, supra note 49, at 355. 
198 Hearing, supra note 46, at 2 (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot, Chairman, 
House Subcomm. on the Constitution). 
2008] FROZEN IN TIME 219 
commonly accepted facts and perceptions. The effect of this, as 
discussed above, is that the USADA is likely to enjoy the same 
deference as the USOC and escape constitutional scrutiny. This 
is particularly troubling, as the USADA, perhaps even more than 
the USOC, is clearly perceived to be an instrument of the United 
States Government. In addition to its designation as the United 
States' "official" anti-doping agency, the USADA, in many cases, 
carries the endorsement of the United States Government.199 
Moreover, the "imprimatur" of the federal government on 
USADA's actions is apparent to the athletes who are tested and 
sanctioned by USADA. For instance, when the BALCO scandal 
was unfolding, many athletes were acutely aware of Congress's 
indispensable assistance with USADA's investigation of athletes 
for doping violations.20o 
Finally, the perception of unfairness is enhanced because the 
state action doctrine as applied to amateur sports has not 
"preserve[d] state sovereignty"201 to regulate private behavior by 
limiting the reach of federal power. In the case of the NCAA, as 
explained above, numerous states reacted to the Tarkanian 
decision by attempting to provide enhanced due process 
protections for institutions and individuals, including student-
athletes, who are targeted by NCAA proceedings.202 The NCAA 
responded to these initiatives by suing for declaratory and 
injunctive relief on the grounds that the state statutes violated 
the Commerce Clause. 203 This effort was successful, and state 
statutes attempting to require the NCAA to provide targeted 
199 Indeed, this endorsement is clear to the media, which frequently reports on 
the USADA as if it were an instrumentality of the United States Government. See 
Sally Jenkins, Due Process? Not for Track Stars, WASH. POST, June 26, 2004, at DOl 
("You get an uneasy feeling from watching USADA's bumbling zealots. You get the 
feeling they'd waive the U.S. Constitution if they could-which is a pretty unsettling 
thing to feel about an organization that is funded by U.S. taxpayer dollars and a 
grant from the White House."); see also Luis Fernando Llosa & L. Jon Wertheim, 
Inside the Steroid Sting, SLeoM, Mar. 6, 2007, http://sportsillustrated. 
cnn.coml2007 Imore/03/06/rx. trouble0312/index.html (listing the USADA among the 
"law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies" involved in a recent bust of individuals 
involved in distributing performance-enhancing substances). 
200 See Koller, supra note 84, at 132 (observing that track and field athletes 
Marion Jones and Kelli White had noted Congress's intense interest in the USADA's 
anti-doping efforts, and even expressed their belief that Congress appeared to be 
singling out track and field and ignoring doping in other sports). 
201 Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 536. 
202 See Kitchin, supra note 51, at 76. 
203 See id. at 76-77. 
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individuals with certain due process protections were either 
struck down or rendered meaningless, leaving states with no 
options for regulating such conduct.204 For instance, in NCAA v. 
Miller, the court held that the NCAA's need for uniformity in its 
enforcement procedures overrode states' interests in ensuring 
due process for its citizens.205 Similarly, state law that might 
apply to actions taken against Olympic Movement athletes is 
pre-empted by the Amateur Sports Act.206 
2. Amateur Athletic Regulation Is Perceived to Be Racist 
Critics of the state action doctrine have pointed out that 
applying the state action requirement to protect individual 
autonomy and freedom is "to look at only one side of the 
equation."207 This equation is a complex one in the area of 
amateur sports, because sports are entwined with and reflective 
of power relationships in society.208 The law applied to sports is 
necessarily so entwined as well, especially with respect to race 
and sports. In this way, what may be most troubling about the 
application of the state action doctrine to amateur sports is that 
the deference shown to organizations such as the NCAA and the 
USOC is necessarily married with a doctrine that originated in 
racism.209 
The Civil Rights Cases and the resulting state action 
requirement, which limited the Fourteenth Amendment to cases 
of active discrimination by the state, were the product of the 1877 
Compromise, which ended Reconstruction21O and reflected the 
entrenched racism that has troubled this country since its 
204 See NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 640 (9th Cir. 1993); NCAA v. Roberts, No. 
TCA 94.40413·WS, 1994 WL 750585, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 8,1994). 
205 Miller, 10 F.3d at 639-40. 
206 See Slaney v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 244 F.3d 580,596 (7th Cir. 2001). 
207 Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 537. "[U]nder the state action doctrine, the 
rights of the private violator always are favored over the rights of the victims. 
Therefore, state action enhances freedom only if it is believed that the liberty to 
violate the Constitution always is more important than the individual rights that 
are infringed." Id. "[The state action] doctrine has seldom been used to shelter 
citizens from coercive federal or judicial power. More often, it has been employed to 
protect the autonomy of business enterprises against the claims of consumers, 
minorities, and other relatively powerless citizens." Brest, supra note 14, at 1330. 
208 See JAY COAKLEY, SPORT IN SOCIETY: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 87-93 
(8th ed. 2004). 
209 See Black, supra note 38, at 70; Silard, supra note 42, at 855; Ugarte, supra 
note 8, at 482. 
210 Silard, supra note 42, at 855. 
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founding. 211 Since that time, with some exceptions,212 the 
doctrine has been invoked with the result being that "private" 
forms of racism were permitted to stand.213 As Charles Black 
noted in the late 1960s: "[T]he 'state action' concept ... has just 
one practical function; if and where it works, it immunizes racist 
practices from constitutional control."214 This. fact cannot be 
ignored in the discussion of the state action doctrine as applied to 
amateur sports, because a significant number of athletes affected 
by NCAA, USOC and now USADA actions are African-American. 
Critics of amateur sports regulation have made a compelling 
case that racism in amateur sports persists, despite the "illusion 
of equality."215 For instance, Professor Timothy Davis and others 
explain that one of the symptoms of racism in college sports is 
that while a substantial number of African-American student-
athletes participate in college revenue-producing sports, there 
are a limited number of African-Americans holding decision-
making positions within the NCAA and at the university level.216 
Additionally, many argue that "another consequence of 
unconscious racism [in college sports] is the disparate impact of 
NCAA rules and regulations on African-American student 
athletes."217 The NCAA's initial eligibility standards, which set 
the benchmarks of academic achievement that must be met for a 
prospective student-athlete to be eligible for a college athletic 
scholarship, is one example that has received a great deal of 
scholarlyattention.218 Critics have pointed to other rules as well, 
such as those limiting a coach's contact with current student-
athletes and regulations limiting the amount of money student-
211 Ugarte, supra note 8, at 507. 
212 See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 717 (1961) 
(holding that a restaurant owner's exclusion of customers based on race could, in 
certain circumstances, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution); 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1948) (holding that the enforcement of a 
restrictive covenant that would limit occupancy of real property based upon race is 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Consitution). 
213 See Silard, supra note 42, at 855; Ugarte, supra note 8, at 481. See generally 
Black, supra note 38 (discussing the "private" forms of racism permitted under the 
state action doctrine). 
214 Black, supra note 38, at 90. 
215 Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence of Racism in 
College Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 640-41 (1995). 
216 Id. at 657. 
217 Id. at 660; see also KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE: RACE 
AND SPORTS IN AMERICA 110 (1996). 
218 See, e.g., SHROPSHIRE, supra note 217, at 103-27. 
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athletes can earn.219 On that issue, one member of Congress 
pointed out that "most of these students are very poor and it is 
very hard for them to even pay for their cost of living. Yet the 
NCAA has really led the fight against a lot of things for athletes, 
including compensating them at least for their living 
expenses."220 Indeed, some commentators have suggested that 
addressing issues of exploitation in amateur sports is a "new 
frontier" for the civil. rights movement.221 Because of the current 
application of the state action doctrine to amateur sports, 
'however, constitutional Equal Protection and Due Process 
challenges to the NCAA are considered impossible.222 
Similarly, actions taken by the USADA-and recognized by 
the USOC-arguably have a disproportionate impact on Mrican-
American athletes, and yet are likely not subject to constitutional 
challenge. For instance, track and field, a sport that is 
traditionally represented by a significant number of Mrican-
American athletes, especially sprinters, is by far the most tested 
sport by the USADA.223 Indeed, all of the athletes sanctioned by 
the USADA as a result of the Senate providing secret grand jury 
documents to the USADA were Mrican-American. This 
emphasis on track and field, with the resulting USADA 
sanctions, has created a perception that Mrican-American 
athletes are cheaters.224 This is particularly troubling because 
219 Davis, supra note 215, at 660-61 (''Many believe that these rules as a whole 
operate to produce disproportionate injury to Mrican-American student-athletes and 
their communities."); see also Timothy Davis, African-American Student Athletes: 
Marginalizing the NCAA Regulatory Structure?, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 199, 199-200 
(1995) (arguing that the "dissonance" between the economic and social realities that 
many Mrican-American student· athletes face and the NCAA rules undermines the 
legitimacy of the NCAA's regulatory scheme). 
220 Hearing, supra note 46, at 14 (statement of Rep. Spencer Bachus, Member, 
House Subcomm. on the Constitution). 
221 Leroy D. Clark, New Directions for the Civil Rights Movement: College 
Athletics as a Civil Rights Issue, 36 How. L.J. 259, 267 (1993). 
222 Id. at 281 (noting that the NCAA is "probably immune to attack" because of 
Tarkanian). 
223 U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2007), http://www.us 
antidoping.org/files/active/who/annuaIJeport_2006.pdf (stating that the USADA 
performed 1,755 drug tests on track and field athletes, by far the largest number for 
any sport). 
224 Gregory Moore, Cheaters Like Gatlin, Others Make Track a Modern Day 
Sodom, BLACK ATHLETE, Aug. 27, 2006, http://www.blackathlete.net/artman2/ 
publishlTrack_amp_Field_36/Cheaters_Like_Gatlin_Others_Make_Track_A_Modern 
_Da_2267.shtml. 
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such actions have the weight of the state behind them due to the 
USADA's unique relationship with Congress and the ONDCP. 
The significant consequences outlined above should not be 
ignored. Accordingly, as explained below, the most effective 
solution might not be preventing constitutional litigation based 
on the state action doctrine, but rather acknowledging the state 
power at work in amateur athletics, permitting the complete 
litigation of the interests of the athletes and the process given. 
In this way, the law could be "settled" more convincingly for both 
athletes and the organizations that regulate them, so that the 
concerns discussed above can fully be heard. 
III. A BETTER ApPROACH-ALLOW CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS TO 
PROCEED ON THE MERITS 
The argument made by this Article, that the static 
conception of the state action doctrine as applied to amateur 
sports has important consequences, begs the question of whether 
such consequences are necessary or can be avoided through a 
different, better approach. I argue that they can, by simply 
allowing constitutional litigation against the NCAA, USOC, and 
now the USADA, to go forward. Doing so is not unfair,225 and it 
will allow important questions of what interests an amateur 
athlete possesses, and to what process an individual affected by 
NCAA, USOC, or USADA action is entitled, to be heard. 
Moreover, the government will have less of an incentive to 
exercise its unchecked authority and influence through amateur 
athletic institutions. Allowing constitutional litigation to go 
forward will also go a long way toward eliminating the 
perception, if not the reality, that protecting organizations such 
as the NCAA, the USOC, and the USADA from constitutional 
litigation is facilitating the exploitation of athletes. 
A. Applying the State Action Doctrine to Amateur Sports 
Organizations Is Not Unfair 
The Supreme Court consistently has explained that the 
central consideration in determining whether the Constitution 
should be applied to ostensibly private entities is whether it is 
"fair" to do SO.226 In the case of the amateur sports organizations 
225 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). 
226 [d. at 923 (stating that the challenged action must be "fairly attributable to 
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discussed here, the NCAA, the USOC, and now the USADA, can 
be fairly held to constitutional standards because they are not 
simply a typical private individual or entity that conducts its 
affairs in the absence of direct influence from the state. In 
addition, it is fair to hold these entities to constitutional 
standards because there are no compelling "countervailing 
reasons" not to. 
Applying the Constitution to the NCAA, the USOC, or the 
USADA, and breaking the static conception of these entities as 
private as a matter of law, would not be akin to applying 
constitutional restrictions to the "homeowner's choice of his 
guests."227 All three were created and are sustained by the direct 
involvement and influence of the state. In the case of the NCAA, 
the entity is substantially controlled and funded by public 
universities. The USOC, while not predominantly funded by the 
federal government,228 was created by and takes substantial 
direction from it. The USADA is substantially funded and 
influenced by the federal government, enforcing policies that the 
United States Government had a hand in creating. Moreover, to 
better achieve the federal government's goals, the USADA was 
established in such a way to avoid constitutional protections for 
the athletes that it sanctions. Accordingly, the argument that 
these entities have a significant public character does not simply 
derive from positivist notions that all power and authority can be 
traced to the state,229 or that the state has an affirmative 
obligation to act to protect athletes and others from the actions of 
"private" sports regulators.23o The state is intervening in 
amateur sports regulation through its control of the NCAA, the 
USOC, and the USADA. This is, then, a matter of the exercise of 
affirmative state power, in the "full and complete sense of the 
phrase"231 and not a matter of state abstention.232 Additionally, 
the State"). 
227 Silard, supra note 42, at 870-71. 
228 Although it is not directly funded by the federal government, as is USADA, 
the USOC derives the majority of its revenue from the exclusive right to license the 
Olympic trademark granted by Congress in the Amateur Sports Act. 
229 Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 520-21. 
230 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 193 
(1989) (rejecting the petitioner's argument that the state violated his Due Process 
rights by failing to intervene to protect him). 
231 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948). 
232 Id. "[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the 
State to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens against invasion by 
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it is also not unfair to hold these entities to constitutional 
limitations because there is no important, "countervailing 
reason"233 against finding state action. The Supreme Court has 
explained that such a countervailing reason can support the 
conclusion of no state action if there are important policy reasons 
for the entity or individual at issue to remain "private."234 Such a 
reason has never been articulated in the state action-amateur 
sport cases.235 
In the absence of a clear countervailing reason to reject a 
finding of state action, the decisions are left to rest simply on the 
outdated, static notion that amateur sports are a purely private 
endeavor. This reflects what has been called "Lochner-like 
thinking,"236 where the state had little involvement in areas such 
as health, education, and general welfare, and of course, sports. 
Yet because of the increased presence of the state in amateur 
athletics, the state action-amateur sport cases have the effect of 
granting significant deference to the state, because the courts 
are allowing the government, in effect, to operate unfettered in 
the regulation of amateur athletics. This deference amounts to 
leaving issues regarding the state's involvement in amateur 
sports to what is essentially a non-justiciable gray area, and it 
private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to 
act ... it forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty or 
property .... " DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. 
233 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n (Brentwood I), 531 
U.S. 288, 295-96 (2001). 
Id. 
From the range of circumstances that could point toward the State behind 
an individual face, no one fact can function as a necessary condition across 
the board for finding state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely 
sufficient, for there may be some countervailing reason against attributing 
activity to the government. 
234 The Supreme Court found that there was a countervailing reason against 
finding state action in a case involving a challenge to the actions of a public 
defender. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). The Supreme Court held 
that the public defender was not an agent of the state, despite being an employee of 
the state, because the attorney's function in that role is to be an adversary of the 
state, not working in concert with it. Id. at 320. 
235 It is hard to imagine that a strong case could be made that there are 
important countervailing reasons to reject a finding of state action in the amateur 
sports context. Unlike the preservation of the attorney-client relationship and 
maintenance of the adversarial system, there is not a valid, independent reason why 
the state could not be responsible for amateur athletics regulation. 
236 Barak-Erez, supra note 114, at 1186. 
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invites increasing involvement in areas that implicate significant 
constitutional concerns. 
Finally, continuing to hold on to static, outdated notions that 
amateur sports organizations such as the USOC and the NCAA 
are private unfairly grants these organizations special treatment. 
Indeed, the common theme in the arguments against 
applying constitutional due process standards to amateur sports 
organizations is that doing so would jeopardize the ability of the 
NCAA and USOC-and now the USADA-to regulate sports 
effectively. This argument consists of part threat and part plea 
for special treatment, and courts and Congress by and large give 
it great weight. The first component of the argument is that 
constitutional protections for athletes would be expensive and 
that constitutional lawsuits and the cost of litigation would make 
it impossible for the entities that regulate athletics to do their 
jobs.237 Because athletics at all levels is such a vital part of 
American society, and the "amateur ideal" so revered, courts and 
Congress are urged to give amateur sports organizations room to 
regulate without these enormous costs. 
The second component of the deference argument is that 
amateur sports organizations are in a unique position, fighting 
an uphill battle to regulate and preserve the amateur ideal 
against extraordinary incentives to cheat. 238 Indeed, both the 
NCAA and the USADA make such arguments and thereby justify 
giving less due process protection because of the unique needs of 
regulating in such a difficult environment. Giving the NCAA, 
USOC, and potentially the USADA deference in this regard 
really then gives deference to the state to protect the "amateur 
ideal" and fight cheating III amateur athletics without 
constitutional restriction. 
237 See Hearing, supra note 46, at 17 (statement of Gary R. Roberts, Deputy 
Dean and Director of the Sports Law Program, Tulane Law School); Brief for 
Colorado High School Activities Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 
3-5, Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. 
Ct. 2489 (2007) (No. 06-427), 2006 WL 3495621, at *3-4; Brief for National 
Federation of State High School Ass'ns as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari at 6-7, Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Acad. 
(Brentwood Il), 127 S. Ct. 2489 (2007) (No. 06-427), 2006 WL 3495622, at *6-7. 
238 See Hearing, supra note 46, at 12 (statement of Gary R. Roberts, Deputy 
Dean and Director of the Sports Law Program, Tulane Law School); Richard W. 
Pound, Performance-Enhancing Drugs in Sport: Response by the International Sports 
Community, 55 CANADIAN INST. OF INT'L AFFAIRS: INT'L J. 485, 488 (2000). 
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This alone, however, fails to provide a compelling reason to 
ignore the state power present in amateur athletics and the 
unfairness to athletes and others that results by effectively 
cutting off any meaningful legal recourse against the entities 
that regulate amateur sports. Additionally, it also fails to 
explain how protecting the "amateur ideal" and preventing 
cheating cannot be done by respecting fundamental notions of 
privacy and due process. For these reasons, it can be argued that 
the application of the state action doctrine to the NCAA, the 
USOC, or the USADA would not unduly extend the reach of the 
state action doctrine, but would instead serve to limit judicial 
deference to amateur sports organizations. Limiting this 
deference is hardly unfair, because deference, by its very nature, 
is not something that an entity is entitled to. 
B. Applying the State Action Doctrine to Amateur Sports 
Organizations Will Not Impede Their Ability to Regulate 
Athletics 
A second reason to allow constitutional litigation to go 
forward against the NCAA, the USOC, and the USADA is that it 
will not, contrary to what these organizations suggest, impede 
their ability to effectively regulate amateur athletics. Indeed, it 
might even enhance it, by acknowledging the state power that is 
present in the regulation of amateur athletics, thereby shifting 
the debate to whether the amateur athlete or other aggrieved 
individual has a sufficient interest at stake and whether this 
interest was adequately protected. It will also minimize the 
perception that in trying to uphold the "amateur ideal" and 
prevent cheating in amateur athletics, the NCAA, the USOC, 
and the USADA, with a mantle of state authority, cheat 
themselves. 
As an initial matter, the NCAA and the USOC are no 
strangers to government influence in their operations. The 
NCAA was subject to constitutional standards for years before 
the Tarkanian ruling, seemingly without disastrous 
consequences. In addition, Congress historically has taken a 
special interest in their activities. For instance, Congress has 
held numerous hearings on the conduct of the USOC.239 Most 
239 See Olympic Family-Functional or Dysfunctional?: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the H. Comm. on the 
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recently, Congress held hearings and proposed reforms related to 
the USOC's governance structure after allegations of ethical 
improprieties.240 During those hearings, the acting president of 
the USOC demonstrated the USOC's dependence on and 
responsiveness to Congress, stating that "[a]ll of this comes down 
to the question of just what Congress, to whom we are ultimately 
accountable, wants the USOC to dO."241 Moreover, as described 
above, it was the pressure of Congress and the President that 
caused the USOC to boycott the 1980 Olympic Games. It was 
also the pressure brought by Congress, and specifically 
individual senators, which ultimately led the USOC to 
discontinue its anti-doping program and create the USADA. 
Similarly, the NCAA has been called before Congress several 
times to answer for what appears to be unfair enforcement 
procedures and harsh treatment of student-athletes.242 This 
Judiciary, 109th Congo (2005); Legislative Efforts to Reform the U.S. Olympic 
Committee: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer 
Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Congo (2003); Does the 
U.S. Olympic Committee's Organizational Structure Impede Its Mission?: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Congo (2003); United States Olympic 
Committee ("USOC'? Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science 
and Transportation, 108th Congo (2003); State of the United States Olympic 
Committee ("USOC'?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation, 108th Congo (2003); Investigation of the Olympic Scandal: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 106th Congo (1999); 
Oversight of Activities of the Olympic Committee: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Consumer of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 103d Congo 
(1994). 
240 See Does the U.S. Olympic Committee's Organizational Structure Impede Its 
Mission?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer 
Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Congo (2003). 
241 Id. at 26 (statement of William C. Martin, Acting President, United States 
Olympic Committee). 
242 See Hearing, supra note 46; Supporting Our Intercollegiate Student-Athletes: 
Proposed NCAA Reforms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and 
Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Congo (2004); 
College Recruiting: Are Student-Athletes Being Protected?: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 108th Congo (2004); Challenges Facing Amateur Athletics: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the 
H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Congo (2002); Amateur Sports Integrity 
Act: Hearing on S. 718 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation, 107th Congo (2001); Student Athlete Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 
3575 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Congo (2000); Stipends for Student 
Athletes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and 
Competitiveness of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Congo (1994); 
Intercollegiate Sports: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer 
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perception fuels congressional inquiries into whether the process 
given to student-athletes and others affected by its actions is 
sufficient. These congressional inquiries indicate that the NCAA 
is in many ways treated as if it were a state actor. This point 
was driven home in a 2004 hearing on "Due Process and the 
NCAA," where one member of the Sub-Committee on the 
Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee pointed out that 
it was not at all clear that the procedures of the NCAA fall within 
the committee's jurisdiction, stating that "due process does fall 
under the jurisdiction of this Subcommittee, but that is generally 
due process by the United States Government, not due process by 
a private organization, such as the NCAA."243 Because the 
NCAA still faces pressure to provide better due process 
protections for student-athletes and others targeted by their 
enforcement proceedings, some commentators have called 
Tarkanian a "pyrrhic" victory.244 Thus, with respect to the 
NCAA, the USOC, and now the USADA, it appears that there is 
not a practice of undiluted liberty or autonomy that the state 
action-amateur sport cases have enhanced. 
In addition, all of these entities give their athletes some 
measure of due process when they take actions against them. 
These due process protections might pass constitutional muster, 
or a court could find, despite the persuasive arguments to the 
contrary, that an amateur athlete does not have a property 
interest at stake. Because the state action decision does not 
settle constitutional litigation, but only gets it to the merits, 
there is then plenty of room for courts to show deference to 
amateur sports organizations in a case-by-case analysis of 
whether athletes have a protected property interest sufficient to 
trigger due process protections, for instance, or a sufficient 
expectation of privacy to support a Fourth Amendment claim. 
If this were the case, it would not mean that constitutional 
litigation was inefficient or wasteful. Allowing athletes to have 
their day in court would have the significant benefit of 
eliminating the perception that amateur sports organizations 
Protection, and Competitiveness of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d 
Congo (1993); Hearings on the Role of Athletics in College Life: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 
lOlst Congo (1989). 
243 Hearing, supra note 46, at 3 (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Member, 
Comm. on the Judiciary). 
244 Verkuil, supra note 148, at 973. 
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such as the NCAA, the USOC, and the USADA have an unfair 
advantage and that such advantage results in the exploitation of 
athletes. Moreover, it would develop a body of case law that 
would credibly settle issues relating to athletes' due process 
rights, more than could be done by simply "freezing" outdated 
and inaccurate conceptions of the USOC and the NCAA. 
Allowing constitutional litigation to go forward against the 
NCAA, the USOC, and the USADA would also go a long way 
toward eliminating the damaging disconnect between application 
of the state action doctrine and the reality of who the state action 
doctrine is disempowering. This would enhance the legitimacy of 
these organizations more than the litigation itself would hinder 
their efficiency. 
c. Individuals Affected by Amateur Sports Regulation Have 
Little Legal or Legislative Recourse 
A final reason to allow constitutional litigation to go forward 
is that the only hope for a meaningful legal option is through 
federal constitutional litigation. As explained above, states have 
little or no options to protect amateur athletes and others from 
perceived abuses by the NCAA, the USOC, and the USADA. 
Moreover, a federal statutory remedy is not likely. First, 
student-athletes cannot possibly match the resources of the 
NCAA in terms of lobbying. Burlette Carter notes that one of the 
NCAA's roles for its members is as "lobbyist and litigation 
strategist" and one of its projects was to work to defeat the 
various state initiatives that sprung up after Tarkanian to give 
greater due process in its enforcement proceedings.245 The NCAA 
also uses litigation to challenge undesirable legislation.246 
Accordingly, while it is true that individual Congressmen have 
taken up issues regarding the NCAA's due process protections in 
certain cases, a broader interest in protecting athletes' rights has 
yet to, and likely will not, develop in Congress.247 
245 Carter, supra note 50, at 24-25. 
246 Id. at 25. 
247 See Hearing, supra note 46, at 16 (statement of Gary R. Roberts, Deputy 
Dean and Director of the Sports Law Program, Tulane Law School) (noting that 
reform of college athletics is "politically unrealistic" because such reform would be 
counter to the "millions of fans who ... 'consume' college athletics as an 
entertainment product"). 
2008] FROZEN IN TIME 231 
Similarly, the access and resources of the USOC and now the 
USADA are no match for the typical athlete. Because of their 
close relationship with the federal government through Congress, 
and, for the USADA, and the ONDCP as well, it is not likely that 
a movement among athletes for greater due process protections 
would get very far. Especially on the issue of fighting 
performance-enhancing drug use, government officials seem not 
at all concerned about due process protections. In fact, it appears 
that at least some in Congress and the Executive Branch fear 
that due process protections would undermine initiatives to 
achieve the government goal of combating drug use in sports. 
In contrast to the extraordinary access and resources the 
NCAA, USOC, and USADA enjoy, the athletes they regulate are 
more akin to participants in an entitlement program. As 
Metzger explains, the "private" entities that administer 
government programs have a significant amount of control over 
the participants. She states: 
[T]his control is enhanced when private entities have a 
monopoly or quasi-monopoly over access to government-
subsidized services or broad powers over how government 
institutions operate. Another factor enhancing private power 
over participants is that privatization frequently occurs in 
contexts marked by relations of dependence .... 248 
Similarly, the ostensibly private entities that regulate 
amateur athletics have an enormous degree of power over 
athletes. Athletes cannot compete, whether in collegiate or 
Olympic Movement sports, without meeting the eligibility 
criteria of the relevant organization-the NCAA, the USOC, or 
the USADA. The dependence of the amateur athlete on the 
entity that regulates his or her sport is not simply because he or 
she must meet the entity's criteria in order to compete. 
Typically, amateur athletes have few resources249 and are 
dependent on the entity to fund their educations, training, and 
living expenses. In the case of NCAA student-athletes, it has 
been said that "most of these students are very poor."250 
248 Metzger, supra note 19, at 1396. 
249 See Sahl, supra note 61, at 641-42 (noting that some authorities consider 
student-athletes a " 'vulnerable' class"). 
250 Hearing, supra note 46, at 5 (statement of Rep. Spencer Bachus, Member, 
House Subcomm. on the Constitution). 
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Additionally, political accountability as a check on the abuse 
of state power through amateur sports organizations is not a 
viable option. Amateur athletes are a distinct voting minority, 
assuming they vote at all. From the perspective of the 
democratic process, then, amateur athletes, because of their 
limited numbers, would have to rely on non-athlete voters to 
galvanize support for legislation that would protect their 
interests. Yet the voting majority, because they are not athletes 
themselves, very likely is misinformed or poorly informed about 
the issues surrounding amateur athletes and the organizations 
that regulate them. For instance, the NCAA provides huge 
entertainment and in this way generates a large amount of 
goodwill. Further, there is a belief that student-athletes are 
lucky, that those who are most vulnerable are being given a 
chance with their college scholarship. Similarly, in the case of 
the USOC and the USADA, there appears to be little interest in 
providing accused athletes with greater due process protections. 
The voting public seems most concerned with general notions of 
catching cheaters and preserving the integrity of the Olympic 
Games and has thus far shown little interest in making sure that 
those caught really are cheaters and that they are treated fairly. 
Accordingly, given their circumstances, it is unlikely that the 
amateur athletes affected by the actions of the NCAA, USOC, 
and USADA will have the collective power to influence Congress 
and secure federal legislation that would protect their rights. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article makes the claim that the law's failure to account 
for new realities of state power in amateur athletics, through a 
static conception of the USOC and the NCAA's status for 
constitutional purposes, has important consequences for both the 
individuals regulated by the USOC, the NCAA, and now the 
USADA as well as the entities themselves. Perhaps the most 
important consequence is that the state action doctrine's failure 
in the amateur sports context has meant not only that state 
power exercised in this area remains unconstrained by the 
Constitution, but it invites further state involvement without 
corresponding constitutional limitation. Such a result, as 
evidenced by the formation and operation of the USADA, is 
particularly troubling in this new anti-doping era, as amateur 
sports organizations, with the power and prestige of the state, 
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are taking actions that implicate significant privacy, Equal 
Protection and Due Process rights. And they are taking actions 
that are only made possible because the federal government is in 
a "unique" relationship with the USADA, making government 
tools available so that the USADA can sanction athletes who 
could otherwise not be sanctioned. 
It is far from clear whether constitutional litigation brought 
by an amateur athlete or others against the NCAA, the USOC, or 
the USADA ultimately would be successful. However, this 
Article argues that merely acknowledging that the Constitution 
applies to these entities is a success. That is, regardless of 
whether in a given situation, for example, due process would 
demand more protection than an athlete received, the litigation 
would be worthwhile because it would have acknowledged the 
state power and presence in amateur athletic regulation. This 
Article therefore argues that the time has come to rethink our 
approach to state action with respect to amateur sports, not only 
to check the state power that is currently exercised in this 
context, but to discourage a further expansion of state power 
without corresponding constitutional protections. Such an 
approach will enhance the legitimacy of our most prominent 
amateur sports organizations by remaining true to the Supreme 
Court's promise that above all, the state action doctrine is meant 
to acknowledge state power in all of its various forms. 251 
251 Lebron v. Nat'} RR Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995). 
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